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This thesis develops and tests the new theory that beliefs in societal justice offer a 
distinctive self-regulatory benefit for members of socially disadvantaged groups. Integrating 
concepts from the social justice and goal motivation literatures I hypothesize that members of 
disadvantaged groups are more likely than members of advantaged social groups to calibrate 
their pursuit of long-term goals to their beliefs about societal justice. In Study 1, low but not high 
SES undergraduates showed greater intentions to persist in the face of poor exam performance to 
the extent that they believed in societal justice. In Study 2, low but not high SES participants 
reported more willingness to invest in career pursuits to the extent that they believed in societal 
justice. In Study 3, ethnic minority, but not ethnic majority, participants who read that societal 
justice was improving reported more willingness to invest resources in pursuit of long-term 
goals, relative to control participants. Study 4 replicated Study 3 using a more subtle 
manipulation of justice beliefs, and demonstrated that the moderating role of ethnic status 
operates due to a difference in the perceived self-relevance of societal justice. Study 5 examined 
the moderating role of SES and ethnic status in a large cross-national sample. Two additional 
studies indicated boundary conditions for the effect, showing that goals which are not perceived 
as relevant to justice operate in the opposite fashion: In Study 6, low SES participants primed 
with injustice withdrew their resources from their academic goals, and reinvested them in their 
social goals. Study 7 replicated this effect, and provided evidence that when the self-relevance of 
justice information is highlighted, it can influence motivation even among members of 
advantaged groups. Ethnic majority participants who read about discrimination against their 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
An undeserving colleague gets promoted, while a deserving one is laid off. Employees’ 
pension funds are stolen by greedy executives as the company goes under. Thousands of children 
in third world nations die of illnesses easily treated in the first world. Women receive less pay for 
equal work. Ethnic minorities face discrimination in the job market. If asked, most people could 
effortlessly produce a long list of injustices, some drawn from first-hand experience and others 
from society at large. And yet, despite this knowledge, most people tend to maintain a view of 
the world as relatively fair and just (Hafer & Bègue, 2005; Jost & Banaji, 1994; Lerner & Miller, 
1978). Indeed, even people most at risk for unjust treatment – that is, members of socially 
disadvantaged groups, such as those low in SES and minority group members – often believe 
that the world largely operates in a fair and legitimate manner (Crosby, 1982; Glick & Fiske, 
2001; Jost, Banaji, & Nosek, 2004; Jost Pelham, Sheldon, & Sullivan, 2003; Major, 1994; but 
see Major, Kaiser, O’Brien, & McCoy, 2007). 
Are there any benefits to believing that the world is reasonably just, even in the face of 
evidence to the contrary? For those who typically perpetrate or benefit from injustice – members 
of advantaged groups – the benefits of such beliefs are easy to understand: These beliefs permit 
continued unjust advantage on an interpersonal level (Walster, Berscheid, & Walster, 1973), as 
well as guiltless maintenance of the social hierarchy (Montada, Schmitt, & Dalbert, 1986; 
Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). However, for those who typically suffer from injustice the benefits of 
believing in societal justice are less obvious (Jost & Burgess, 2000; Quinn & Crocker, 1999; 
Callahan-Levy & Messe, 1979; Jost, 1997; Jost & Hunyady, 2002; Jost & Thompson, 2000; 
Major, McFarlin, & Gagnon, 1984; Pelham & Hetts, 2002). Nonetheless, theory and research 
suggests members of these groups do not wholeheartedly abandon beliefs in societal justice (Jost, 
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Banaji, & Nosek, 2004) and do not experience only negative outcomes as a result of those beliefs 
(Dzuka & Dalbert, 2002, 2007; Jost, Glaser, et al., 2003, Study 5; Kluegel & Smith, 1986; Lane, 
1962; Lipkus, Dalbert, & Siegler, 1996). This raises an intriguing question: What specific 
functions, if any, do these beliefs serve for members of disadvantaged groups? To date there 
have been few attempts to answer this question and especially few that use experimental methods 
to test causal mechanisms though which justice beliefs might benefit members of disadvantaged 
groups. In the current research, I hypothesize that belief in societal justice offers a specific self-
regulatory benefit for members of socially disadvantaged groups, allowing them to more 
confidently commit to long-term goals. Specifically, by “disadvantaged groups,” I mean those 
social groups which have historically experienced adverse social and economic conditions, 
relative to other social groups, sometimes for illegitimate reasons. For instance, many ethnic and 
religious minority groups can be described as socially disadvantaged groups, as can other groups 
low in socioeconomic status. 
Believing in Societal Justice 
According to a substantial literature within social, personality, and organizational 
psychology, people are motivated to believe that their social worlds operate justly – that is, that 
people get what they deserve in life (Adams, 1965; Jost et al., 2004; Lerner, 1980; van den Bos 
& Lind, 2002; Walster et al., 1973). Early empirical investigations of the “belief in a just world” 
demonstrated that exposure to innocent victims elicits a motivated response: When people cannot 
restore actual justice, they will restore psychological justice by altering their perception of the 
situation so that it appears just (e.g., Lerner, 1965; Lerner & Miller, 1978). For example, 
numerous studies have demonstrated that when people cannot provide innocent victims with 
compensation, they derogate or blame the victims for their misfortune (e.g., Lerner & Simmons, 
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1966). Based on these early findings, Lerner developed Just-World Theory, proposing that 
people have a need to believe that their world is one in which people get what they deserve and 
deserve what they get (Lerner, 1980). Subsequent research has supported the pervasive influence 
of this need to maintain justice beliefs, showing that people tend to rationalize injustice even 
when it impacts them personally (for better or worse) (see Hafer and Bègue, 2005; Jost & Kay, 
2010, for reviews). Research on system justification theory (Jost & Banaji, 1994), in fact, has 
directly noted the tendency for members of disadvantaged groups to judge their social systems as 
fair and legitimate, despite the fact that these systems contribute to their disadvantage (Jost, 
Banaji, & Nosek, 2004).  
If humans are motivated to believe that their world is just, this belief likely serves one or 
more functional purposes, providing benefits to the believer. The present research complements 
recent social psychological work beginning to explore these benefits. Dalbert and her colleagues 
(Dalbert, 2002; Dzuka & Dalbert, 2002, 2007; Lipkus, Dalbert, & Siegler, 1996; Otto & Dalbert, 
2005) suggest that believing in a just world functions as a positive illusion, and as such is 
correlated with increased well-being and mental health, as well as decreased delinquent behavior 
(c.f. Jost & Hunyady, 2002; Jost & Thompson, 2000; Napier & Jost, 2008). Other theorists have 
suggested that justice beliefs can serve to help people cope with feelings of uncertainty (van den 
Bos, 2001; van den Bos & Lind, 2002), to help satisfy people’s need to feel like autonomous 
agents (van Prooijen, 2009), to serve needs to identify with and belong to social groups (Lind & 
Tyler, 1988; Tyler, 1989), and, in the case of system justification, to satiate a range of existential, 
epistemic, and relational needs (Jost, Banaji, & Nosek, 2004). Thus, research has begun to 
elucidate benefits that may accompany beliefs in societal justice. In the present set of studies, I 
contribute to this growing body of research by testing the hypothesis that societal justice beliefs 
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can also encourage commitment to the pursuit of long-term goals (Hafer, 2000; Hafer, Bègue, 
Choma, & Dempsey, 2005), especially for members of disadvantaged groups. Before I explain 
my hypothesis in more depth, I provide a brief background of research on long-term goal pursuit, 
to situate the contribution of the current research. 
Pursuing Long-Term Goals 
The pursuit of long-term goals is fundamental to the maintenance of psychological and 
physical well-being: To build relationships, to provide for family, and to maintain good health, 
people need to set, initiate, and pursue goals over time (Baumeister, Schmeichel, & Vohs, 2007; 
Emmons, 1989; Zirkel & Cantor, 1990). However, goals can rarely be accomplished without a 
considerable investment of resources: Merely hoping for a windfall or a lucky break will likely 
not help people successfully save for retirement, lower blood pressure, or earn a promotion. 
Instead, people need to invest effort, self-control, and material resources, and typically over an 
extended period of time (Baumeister, 1998; Baumeister, Vohs, & Tice, 2007; Carver & Scheier, 
1990; Heckhausen & Schulz, 1995). Indeed, the goals most often reported as highly important – 
career goals, financial goals, family goals, and health goals – can take months, years, and 
decades to achieve (Emmons, 1989; Zirkel & Cantor, 1990).  
Research on self-regulation has uncovered a number of internal psychological processes 
that predict successful goal-pursuit over time. For example, the beliefs that people hold about 
their goals, traits, and abilities can have a strong impact on how willing and interested they are in 
pursuing long-term goals (Bandura, 1986; Dweck, Chiu, & Hong, 1995). Other variables, such as 
feelings of power, can also influence how well people are able to regulate their behavior in 
pursuit of their goals. For example, Guinote (2007) induced some participants to feel powerful 
by asking them to remember a time when they evaluated others and controlled their outcomes, or 
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by asking them to assume a managerial role relative to another participant’s employee role. 
Participants led to feel powerful were quicker to both set and act on goals, relative to participants 
made to feel powerless. 
In addition, recent research has uncovered routes through which features of the social 
environment, external to the individual, can predict successful long-term goal pursuit (Drigotas 
et al., 1999; Finkel et al., 2006; Fitzsimons & Finkel, in press; Finkel & Fitzsimons, in press; 
Rawn & Vohs, 2006). For instance, achieving goals over time is easier in a supportive social 
environment (Fitzsimons & Shah, 2008), and people’s motivation to pursue their goals is likely 
higher in such environments (Fitzsimons & Finkel, 2010). In the current paper, I extend this 
theorizing about goal-supportive environments to the domain of societal justice. Although justice 
may not directly help people achieve their goals in the way that supportive others do, justice 
makes it sensible for people to invest time, effort and material resources in pursuit of their goals. 
Thus, just as people may prefer to pursue goals when immersed in close relationships that they 
see as promoting their goal progress, I suggest that they will also be more motivated to pursue 
goals when in social contexts that they see as operating justly. By “motivated to pursue goals” I 
mean willing to engage in self-regulatory efforts directed at long-term goals (Baumeister & 
Vohs, 2007).  In the current thesis, I test how people’s beliefs about the justice of the social 
environment impact their motivation to pursue long-term goals. 
Linking the Fields of Justice and Self-Regulation: How Believing in Societal Justice May 
Promote the Pursuit of Long-Term Goals 
In an early precursor to the thinking tested in the current paper, Lerner (1980) suggested 
that people’s motivation to pursue long-term goals may be dependent on their beliefs in societal 
justice. In particular, he theorized that people develop a “personal contract” with society, 
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whereby they agree to invest time and effort in order to attain long-term rewards (Lerner, 1977, 
1980; Lerner, Miller, & Holmes, 1976). Because people’s lives are organized around important 
goals, and because pursuing those goals is a costly endeavor, requiring the investment of 
substantial time and effort, Lerner argued that people need to be confident that sacrifices made in 
the present will pay off in the future. The belief that one’s environment is just provides exactly 
this assurance: It gives people confidence that their efforts will be duly rewarded, which allows 
them to continue investing resources in the absence of immediate gain.  
Lerner’s theorizing implies that justice is an important part of any goal-supportive 
environment. Indeed, he suggests that believing in societal justice is actually necessary to 
commit to long-term goal pursuit. This implication leads to a hypothesis that has as yet not been 
explored: People’s beliefs about societal justice should determine, at least in part, their 
motivation to pursue their long-term goals. Because achieving most important goals requires the 
commitment of resources over an extended period of time, people need to believe that their 
actions will be justly rewarded to commit self-regulatory resources toward a long-term goal 
(Hafer, 2000; Lerner, 1980). If goal-directed efforts are not generally rewarded with deserved 
outcomes, setting and pursuing goals is unlikely to be effective. Imagine a woman who hopes to 
ultimately earn the position of CEO at her father-in-law’s company. If she believes that her 
chances of earning that position are based on her own performance over the years – that is, if she 
believes that her father-in-law will make an unbiased choice of successor – she will be likely to 
try hard, putting in extra hours and giving her all to the job, to achieve her long-term goal. 
However, if she believes that her chances of earning the position are also based on other factors – 
that is, if she believes that her father-in-law might choose his biological daughter out of family 
loyalty, or choose a particular colleague because of a long-standing romantic attraction – she will 
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be less likely to work hard to achieve this long-term goal. In other words, when committing 
one’s efforts to long-term goal pursuit, societal justice should matter (Hafer, 2000; Lerner, 
1980).  
Prior research provides initial support for the importance of societal justice beliefs in self-
regulation. First, in a correlational field study of young male prisoners justice beliefs were 
positively associated with greater confidence in personal goal achievement (goals such as 
starting professional training, becoming rich, avoiding future incarceration, etc.; Otto & Dalbert, 
2005). Second, research on victim derogation finds that long-term goal focus increases justice 
concerns. Merely writing about long-term academic goals (which presumably increases one’s 
focus on long-term goals) leads to greater victim derogation (Hafer, 2000). Similarly, people 
high in chronic orientation toward future goals derogate victims more, but only if they are low in 
“primary psychopathy,” that is, only when they value deserving their obtained outcomes (Hafer, 
Bègue, et al., 2005).  Thus, although experimental evidence for the hypothesis that people 
actually calibrate their motivation to pursue long-term goals to their beliefs about societal justice 
does not yet exist, there is good support for the general notion that long-term goal focus and 
justice concerns are psychologically linked.  
The Special Case of Members of Disadvantaged Groups 
Here, I hypothesize that this psychological linkage is particularly strong for members of 
historically disadvantaged social groups. I will unfold the logic underlying this hypothesis in 
three stages: (1) Group status does in general moderate people’s reactions to societal (in)justice;  
(2) Societal justice carries more personal implications for members of disadvantaged groups than 
for members of advantaged groups;  and (3) One specific consequence of the latter point is that 
among members of disadvantaged groups, societal justice beliefs should be coupled more 
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strongly with expectations for personal justice, which should ultimately drive commitment to 
long-term goal pursuit among members of all groups. 
Group membership and reactions to societal justice 
First, then, my main hypothesis about the differential links between societal justice 
beliefs and self-regulation for members of socially advantaged and disadvantaged groups is 
consistent with extensive findings suggesting that status moderates reactions to societal justice. 
When members of low status groups, which are typically socially disadvantaged groups, believe 
that their world is fair, this leads them to also believe that that their low status is justifiable and 
legitimate. For example, for low status group members, activated or endorsed beliefs in a 
meritocratic society are associated with reduced feelings of personal entitlement (O’Brien & 
Major, 2009), increased endorsement of stereotypes that justify their group’s low status (McCoy 
& Major, 2007), derogation of fellow group members who make claims of discrimination 
(Kaiser & Miller, 2001, 2003), and reduced perceptions of discrimination against their own 
group members (Major, Gramzow, McCoy, Levin, Schmader, Sidanius, 2002). In contrast, 
among members of high status groups, which are typically socially advantaged, such justice 
beliefs are associated with increased feelings of entitlement, increased derogation of outgroup 
members who claim discrimination, and increased defense of their group’s status in general (e.g., 
Major et al., 2002). These findings, although they do not directly speak to the hypotheses tested 
in the current research, provide support for the notion that members of high versus low status 
groups show important differences in their reactions to injustice. 
Personal implications of societal justice 
Second, a point with more direct relevance to the present purposes is that societal 
injustice does not carry equal implications for everyone: Objectively speaking, members of 
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certain groups – namely, socially disadvantaged groups – are far likelier to be victims of societal 
injustice than members of other groups. In other words, societal injustice is likely to have more 
obvious personal implications for the outcomes of members of disadvantaged groups, who have 
historically been victims of discrimination. For this reason, I suggest that the link between 
societal justice and self-regulation may be stronger for members of disadvantaged groups. That 
is, because members of disadvantaged groups are more likely than members of advantaged 
groups to believe that their ability to successfully achieve goals (and recoup their investments of 
effort and time) could be negatively impacted by societal injustice, I propose they will calibrate 
their goal investments tightly to their beliefs about societal justice. Conversely, members of 
advantaged groups may be aware that societal injustice largely targets others. If so, members of 
advantaged groups should be less likely than members of disadvantaged groups to consider 
societal justice when deciding how much to invest in long-term goals. 
This notion is consistent with basic theorizing about the role of expectations in the goal 
pursuit process. According to expectancy-value theories of motivation, people’s willingness to 
pursue long-term goals will be shaped by how much they expect to succeed, in addition to how 
positively they view the goal end-state (Atkinson, 1957; Eccles et al., 1983; Feather, 1982; 
Wigfield & Eccles, 1992). Thus, people’s beliefs regarding the relative likelihood that effort and 
hard work will be rewarded justly with success are necessary for motivation – simply finding the 
goal end state desirable is not sufficient. To the extent that members of disadvantaged groups 
believe that injustice exists, they may be concerned that their efforts will not determine their 
achievement. For this reason, their motivation to pursue long-term goals may be more connected 
with societal justice beliefs than that of members of advantaged groups, who are less likely to see 
societal justice as relevant for achieving their goals. Note that this account does not suggest that 
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members of advantaged and disadvantaged groups differ in the extent to which they may 
calibrate their motivation to their beliefs about the extent to which their efforts will determine 
their achievements, but only in the extent to which they draw implications for the latter from 
their beliefs about societal justice. 
Members of disadvantaged versus advantaged groups may also have different 
overarching or higher order goals with regards to their position in society, and these higher order 
goals may explain the differential effects of justice beliefs. Members of socially disadvantaged 
groups may pursue their long-term achievement goals primarily to serve an ultimate goal of 
increasing their position in society. Because a change in social status would only be possible if 
society is fair and just enough to permit such upward mobility, members of disadvantaged 
groups may see societal justice as more relevant to their long-term goal pursuits. In contrast, 
members of advantaged groups may primarily be concerned with maintaining their positive 
status, or with small upward change. Because the stakes of this pursuit are lower, in many ways, 
and because maintaining status is easier than changing status, advantaged group members may 
not feel that societal justice is as relevant to these long-term pursuits.  
Global versus personal justice 
Third, one specific instance of the more general point about group membership and the 
personal implications of societal justice highlights the distinction between global justice beliefs, 
personal justice beliefs, and justice beliefs for others (Lipkus, Dalbert, & Siegler, 1996). 
Members of disadvantaged versus advantaged groups are likely to show different patterns of 
association between global justice beliefs and personal justice beliefs, and I suggest that these 
differential linkages will result in distinct effects on self-regulation. Because members of 
disadvantaged groups know that they and their fellow group-members are likely targets for 
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discrimination, they know that societal justice has implications for their own likelihood of just 
treatment. Thus, members of disadvantaged groups likely connect their global, or societal, justice 
beliefs to their personal justice beliefs. As such, the more these individuals believe their society 
is just, the more they should expect and perceive just treatment for themselves. Members of 
disadvantaged groups who believe in societal justice should therefore have greater confidence 
that their personal efforts will be justly rewarded. This confidence should in turn support their 
motivation to pursue long-term goals. Members of disadvantaged groups who see their society as 
less just, however, should lack the confidence that their personal efforts will be justly rewarded, 
and thus be less motivated to pursue their long-term goals. Members of advantaged groups, on 
the other hand, may lack the personal and group experiences that would lead them to see societal 
justice as relevant to their own treatment and outcomes. Instead, they may view societal justice 
as more relevant to others’ just treatment – specifically, to the just treatment of members of 
disadvantaged groups. Thus, their beliefs about societal justice should have relatively little 
influence on their own motivation. 
The distinction I am emphasizing here is that global justice beliefs should be closely 
coupled with personal justice beliefs for members of disadvantaged, but not advantaged, groups; 
and this distinction is at the core of my hypothesis about group differences in the societal justice 
beliefs – motivation link. That being said, the distinction between global and personal justice 
beliefs highlights a secondary hypothesis: When societal justice beliefs are made to be explicitly 
self-relevant – in other words, when the link between global and personal justice beliefs is 
imposed – they may lead members of both advantaged and disadvantaged groups to adjust their 
long-term goal motivation. My main hypothesis rests on the assumption that members of 
disadvantaged groups see societal, or global, justice beliefs as more relevant to their own 
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personal goals than do members of advantaged groups. But when societal justice information is 
directly self-relevant, and carries clear implications about the likelihood of members of 
advantaged groups themselves being treated justly, I predict that it may influence motivation 
even among members of these groups. 
This global versus personal justice hypothesis may appear at first glance inconsistent with 
a body of research suggesting that members of disadvantaged groups are motivated to avoid 
perceiving themselves as vulnerable to discrimination. Indeed, even when people perceive 
discrimination against their own group, they hesitate to admit that they themselves have been 
victims of discrimination (e.g., Crosby, 1982; Taylor, Wright, & Porter, 1994). This research 
directly suggests that the global and personal justice beliefs of members of disadvantaged groups 
do differ, which may seem to run counter to the logic I unfolded in the preceding paragraph. 
However, closer scrutiny shows this inconsistency to be superficial only. 
First, although the global and personal justice beliefs of members of disadvantaged 
groups may differ in absolute terms, they still may be positively related. That is, even if members 
of disadvantaged groups sometimes perceive themselves as being less at-risk for discrimination, 
compared to their group as a whole, it is still likely that those perceptions of risk will vary 
together. Second, the suggestion that perceiving oneself as vulnerable to discrimination is 
debilitatingly frightening is precisely the thrust of my argument, although I have been more 
specific about how that fear is expressed. While the research I mentioned above suggests that 
people try to protect themselves by minimizing their feelings of vulnerability, proponents of this 
research generally do not suggest that these feelings can be eliminated completely. Indeed, 
members of disadvantaged groups generally do not perceive that they are at no risk of 
discrimination (e.g., Taylor, Wright, Moghaddam, & Lalonde, 1990), and not surprisingly they 
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routinely perceive their risk of discrimination as much higher than do members of advantaged 
groups (e.g., Operario, & Fiske, 2001). In fact, others have argued that under some 
circumstances members of disadvantaged groups are motivated to perceive that they have been 
victims of discrimination, because this can protect their feelings of self-worth following failure 
(Crocker & Major, 2003; Crocker, Voekl, Testa, & Major, 1991; Major & Crocker, 1993).  
In any case, the fact that certain motivational states push people to endorse higher or 
lower levels of belief notwithstanding, what concerns me here is the consequences of those 
levels of belief. My prediction is that the societal justice beliefs of members of disadvantaged 
groups relate to their personal justice beliefs, or their expectations about their own just treatment, 
and that these expectations then act as the key mediator in the link between societal justice 
beliefs and long-term goal motivation. 
Two final caveats 
In summary, then, I suggest that because members of socially advantaged and 
disadvantaged groups differ in the extent to which they see societal injustice as holding potential 
implications for their own outcomes, there should be differences in the extent to which 
perceptions of societal justice will facilitate commitment to goal pursuit for members of 
advantaged and disadvantaged groups. Specifically, I hypothesize that, relative to members of 
advantaged groups, members of disadvantaged groups should show a tendency to calibrate their 
motivation to pursue long-term goals to their beliefs about societal justice
1
. That being said, this 
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Note that I am not suggesting that members of disadvantaged groups, who perceive societal unfairness as 
more personally relevant, are more motivated to see the world as fair than members of advantaged groups, who view 
societal unfairness as less personally relevant. Both groups of people might be equally motivated to perceive the 




primary hypothesis can be qualified in at least two ways, leading to two additional sub-
hypotheses. 
First, the justice beliefs – motivation link is likely to emerge particularly strongly for 
goals that people intuitively see as relevant to justice. For example, academic goals and career 
goals may be ones that members of disadvantaged groups are particularly likely to calibrate to 
their beliefs about societal justice, because they may see obvious ways that societal justice can 
impact those goals. In contrast, people may see fewer connections between societal justice and 
other goals such as spiritual goals or health goals, and as a result members of socially 
disadvantaged groups may be less likely to calibrate the pursuit of those kinds of goals to their 
justice beliefs. Therefore, I chose to focus on academic and career goals for the first tests of my 
main hypothesis, and then later I expand on my sub-hypothesis regarding the justice-relevance of 
the goal domain. 
Second, I suspect that members of advantaged groups may not always be completely 
immune to societal justice beliefs, when it comes to their motivation. I expect that these 
individuals will calibrate their long-term goals to their beliefs justice when these beliefs are 
explicitly self-relevant. Therefore, my second sub-hypothesis is that when societal justice 
information carries unambiguous implications for members of socially advantaged groups 
themselves, then they will calibrate their long-term goals in the same way as members of 
disadvantaged groups. 
Overview of Studies 
Five studies tested my primary hypothesis that beliefs in societal justice facilitate and 
encourage the commitment to long-term goal pursuit, especially for members of socially 
disadvantaged groups. Study 1 examines whether participants’ beliefs in societal justice interact 
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with their socioeconomic status (SES) to predict their intention to resume goal pursuit after 
failure (a hallmark of motivation, Atkinson, 1957; Carver & Scheier, 1990; Heckhausen, 1991; 
Lewin, 1926; Wicklund & Gollwitzer, 1982). Study 2 employs the same design but a different 
measure of motivation, specifically motivation to pursue long-term career goals. Study 3 uses 
experimental manipulations of societal justice beliefs to test my hypothesis about their causal 
impact on career motivation among members of low but not high status groups. This study also 
broadens the definition of advantaged group status by testing the hypothesis with members of 
ethnic majority or minority groups. Study 4 examines whether participants’ motivation to pursue 
long-term career goals is affected by (a) a priming manipulation that manipulates societal justice 
beliefs via a scrambled-sentence task, and (b) their status as members of ethnic majority or 
minority groups. This study also examines whether the effect of societal justice beliefs on 
disadvantaged group members’ motivation to pursue long-term goals is mediated by their beliefs 
about personal unjust treatment. Finally, Study 5 tests whether my hypotheses about the 
interactive effects of groups status and justice perceptions on motivation generalizes to a large 
international sample of respondents. 
Following this initial set of studies, two additional studies examine my two sub-
hypotheses. In Study 6, I predict that reminders of injustice will lead individuals with low SES to 
plan to spend less time on academic pursuits, but I draw on a sizeable literature on the dynamics 
of multiple goal-regulation (e.g., Kernan & Lord, 1990; Schmidt & Deshon, 2007; Shah, 
Friedman, & Kruglanski, 2002) to predict a reverse pattern for individuals’ plans to invest in 
activities related to non-justice-relevant goals. In Study 7, I replicate that finding, while at the 
same time examining more closely the role that justice beliefs can play in determining the 
motivation of members of advantaged groups. Specifically, I expose members of advantaged 
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groups to information about discriminatory practices that specifically target their group, and 




CHAPTER 2: Socioeconomic status, justice beliefs and persistence following failure 
In Study 1, I examined the relationship between motivation to pursue long-term goals and 
the belief that the world operates in a fair and just manner, and how membership in a socially 
disadvantaged group moderates this relationship. In this study, I measured socioeconomic status 
(SES), a straightforward indicator of membership to a socially disadvantaged group. I also 
measured belief in ultimate justice, or the belief that justice prevails in the long-term. This belief 
is distinguished from the belief in immanent justice, which is concerned with the immediate 
justice of short-term outcomes (see Maes, 1998; Maes & Kals, 2002; Maes & Schmitt, 1999). As 
noted by Hafer and Bègue (2005), it is a belief in ultimate justice, with its focus on eventual, 
future outcomes, which is most likely to encourage investment in long-term goals. I predicted 
that SES and justice beliefs will interact to predict motivation to pursue long-term goals. 
I operationalized motivation to pursue long-term goals as undergraduates’ commitment to 
their academic achievement goals after performing poorly on an examination. Specifically, after 
students received their grades for a course midterm, I asked them to report both how well they 
felt they did on the test, and how committed they were to performing well on the next test. 
Persistent motivation in the face of challenges, negative feedback, or poor performance is a 
hallmark feature of motivation (Atkinson, 1957; Carver & Scheier, 1990; Heckhausen, 1991; 
Lewin, 1926; Wicklund & Gollwitzer, 1982). Such motivation is also necessary for the pursuit of 
long-term goals – if the goal pursuer disengages after encountering difficulty, success (in all but 
the easiest of tasks) is impossible (Carver & Scheier, 1990; Blackwell, Trzesniewski, & Dweck, 
2007; Dweck et al, 1995). Thus, I predict that for students who felt they performed poorly on the 
midterm, justice beliefs will be positively related to commitment to performing well on the next 
midterm. I expect this relationship to be stronger among participants who report low SES, 
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relative to participants who report high SES. My predictions are specific to intentions to persist 
following poor performance, which discriminates those high from those low in motivation 
(Atkinson, 1957; Carver & Scheier, 1990; Heckhausen, 1991; Lewin, 1926; Wicklund & 
Gollwitzer, 1982). Persistence following good performance is in fact often reduced among 
people high in motivation, and thus would be hard to distinguish from the already-low 
persistence of people low in motivation (Förster, Liberman, & Higgins, 2005; Liberman & 
Förster, 2000; Marsh, Hicks, & Bink, 1998; Marsh, Hicks, & Bryan, 1999; Zeigarnik, 1927).  
Method 
Participants. Forty-six undergraduate students (9 male, 37 female; average age 21.1 
years) participated in this study. They were recruited by the teaching assistants for their courses 
(Social Psychology, Interpersonal Relationships), who requested volunteers at the beginning of 
lecture and posted the study website url on the overhead projector. Students participated on a 
volunteer basis, receiving no compensation. All participants agreed to complete an initial set of 
questionnaires, and to complete a follow-up questionnaire after a midterm examination in the 
course. The sample described above excludes two participants who failed to complete the follow-
up questionnaire. 
Procedure. Participants first accessed a website where they could complete the initial 
questionnaire set, which included two of my independent variables. As a measure of justice 
beliefs, participants completed the Belief in Ultimate Justice (BUJ) scale (see Anderson, Kay, & 
Fitzsimons, in press). The scale was validated in a large sample (N = 800) as part of mass testing 
administered at the beginning of the semester. In that sample, the scale showed high internal 
consistency (Cronbach’s α = .83) and a .50 correlation with scores on Lipkus’ (1991) Global 
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Belief in Just World scale, a measure of justice beliefs that has been used extensively in past 
research. 
The BUJ scale consists of seven items rated on a seven-point scale ranging from 1 
(strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree); see Appendix A for specific items. The BUJ scale 
showed high internal consistency (Cronbach’s α = .80). I obtained scores by reverse-scoring the 
two items worded in the direction of weak beliefs in ultimate justice, and then averaging scores 
from all seven items. 
Participants subsequently answered questions about their demographic characteristics, 
including a question about their socio-economic status (SES). Because I was interested in the 
psychological effects of participants’ sense of their membership in advantaged (high social 
status) or disadvantaged (low social status) groups, I used a subjective indicator of SES, as 
opposed to the objective indicators, such as family income or parental educational achievement. 
Subjective indicators have been used successfully by other researchers (Kraus, Piff, & Keltner, 
2009; Singh-Manoux, Marmot, & Adler, 2005); but more importantly my theoretical reasoning 
emphasizes people’s perceptions that they belong to a disadvantaged group, which is better 
captured by subjective SES than by objective measures of SES. Participants rated the following 
item: “If you had to position yourself on a scale of socioeconomic status (SES), where would 
you place yourself?” They did so using a seven-point scale ranging from “extremely low SES” to 
“extremely high SES”. In a separate sample of 72 participants, I found that responses on the 
subjective SES measure were positively correlated with annual family income (rated on a six-
point scale ranging from 1 [below $25,000] to 6 [above $125,000], r = .70, p < .001, mother’s 
occupational prestige, r = .29, p < .02, and father’s occupational prestige (both prestige measures 
taken from Barratt, 2006; see Appendix B), r = .35 p < .004. 
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Approximately one week after participants completed the initial measures, and after they 
received their grade on a class midterm, they completed a follow-up online questionnaire 
assessing the third independent variable (perceived performance on the midterm), as well as the 
dependent variable (commitment to performing well on the next midterm). Participants first rated 
three items measuring their perceived performance on the midterm. I measured performance as a 
subjective perception, rather than use participants’ actual grades, because the experience of 
success or failure depends on whether the individual meets his or her own standards or 
expectations. To some students, a grade of seventy percent might represent significant success, 
whereas to others, that same grade represents utter failure.  
Participants first used a five-point scale to complete the following statement: “Was your 
grade…” The points on the scale ranged from “much lower than expected” to “much higher than 
expected.” They then used two scales to indicate how happy they were with their grade and how 
satisfied they were with their grade, using seven-point scales ranging from “extremely unhappy / 
dissatisfied” to “extremely happy / satisfied.” I standardized all three of participants’ ratings to 
make the different scales comparable, and combined them into a single index of perceived 
performance, producing a measure with high internal consistency (Cronbach’s α = .89). 
Participants also rated three items assessing their commitment to perform well on the 
next midterm. Specifically, participants used a seven-point scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 7 
(extremely) to respond to the following items: “Please rate the extent to which you plan to work 
hard to do well on the next midterm,” “Please rate how important it is to you to do well on the 
next midterm,” and “Please rate your willingness to make sacrifices in order to do well on the 
next midterm.” Items were averaged into a single index of commitment, producing a measure 




Means, standard deviations and intercorrelations of the independent variables are 
presented in Table 1
2
. 
Table 1              
Means, standard deviations, and intercorrelations of independent variables (Study 1)     
 Descriptives Correlations 
 Mean (SD) SES BUJ    
Socioeconomic status (SES) 4.35 (1.06) - - 
Belief in Ultimate Justice (BUJ) 4.43 (0.98) .15 - 
Perceived performance 0.00 (0.94) -.07 -.14    
t 
p < .10 * p < .05 ** p < .01 
 
To test my prediction that intentions to persist would be related to justice beliefs for those 
low (but not high) in SES, I regressed participants’ commitment to perform well on the next 
midterm on centered scores for subjective SES, BUJ, perceived performance, as well as all 
possible interactions (see Table 2). I used the Aiken and West (1991) method to examine all 
interactions.  
 
Table 2              
Unstandardized regression coefficients for predictors of participants’ commitment (Study 1)    
Predictor Unstandardized SE Conf. Int. (95%) t
a
 p-value 
 Coefficient (B)       
Subjective SES 0.05 0.15 (-0.27, 0.36) 0.29 .77 
Perceived performance -0.13 0.15 (-0.44, 0.18) 0.85 .40 
BUJ 0.13 0.14 (-0.31, 0.56) 0.58 .57 
SES X performance -0.24 0.18 (-0.61, 0.12) 1.34 .19 
SES X BUJ -0.37 0.28 (-0.94, 0.20) 1.32 .19 
Performance X BUJ -0.33 0.24 (-0.81, 0.15) 1.39 .17 
SES X performance X BUJ 0.59 0.31 (-0.03, 1.21) 1.94 .06   
a
 The degrees of freedom are 38. 
 
                                                 
2
 Note that in this study, as in all subsequent studies, the standard deviations of all variables are quite 
similar between social groups, and that if anything, there is a slight trend toward more variability among members of 
advantaged groups. Thus, a weaker relationship between fairness beliefs and motivation among members of 
advantaged groups, compared to members of disadvantaged groups, cannot be explained by insufficient variability 
among members of advantaged groups. 
22 
 
Although the three-way interaction was only marginally significant, β = .49, t(38) = 1.98, 
p = .06, the pattern of data largely supported my predictions. Among participants who felt they 
had done poorly on the test, justice beliefs positively predicted commitment for participants low 
in subjective SES, B = 1.33, t(38) = 2.21, p < .04, but not for participants high in subjective SES, 
B = -.75, t(38) =  1.52, p = .14 (see Figure 1). The interaction between subjective SES and BUJ – 
attained marginal significance, B = -0.83, t(38) = 1.88, p < .07. A parallel analysis revealed that 
when participants felt they had done well on the test neither SES, justice beliefs, nor their 
interaction significantly predicted commitment, all Bs < .21, all ts(38) < 1.07, all ps > .29. 
Figure 1. Relationship of participants’ commitment to doing well on the second test and justice beliefs, depending 





This first study provides preliminary evidence that justice beliefs may increase the 
motivation to pursue long-term goals among members of socially disadvantaged groups. Among 
students who felt that they had performed poorly on a test, a positive relationship between justice 
beliefs and commitment to performing well in the future was observed, but only among those 
who perceived themselves as belonging to a low-SES group. Attesting to the everyday relevance 
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of this phenomenon, these results were found using participants’ impressions and intentions 
regarding real university courses.  
Some features of Study 1 limit the conclusions that can be drawn from its findings. First, 
although the most critical predicted effect, demonstrating the influence of justice beliefs on the 
motivation of low SES participants, reached conventional levels of significance, the predicted 
interaction effects were only marginally significant. Second, since this study tested participants’ 
reactions to real world successes and failures there was a lack of the experimental control that is 
needed to draw conclusions about causal influences. And finally, although I did predict that the 
relation between justice beliefs and goal pursuit would be strongest among participants who 
reported low SES, I expected it would still be present, albeit significantly weaker, among 
participants who reported high SES. Contrary to this expectation, these latter participants’ justice 
beliefs did not predict their persistence following poor performance. Given that Study 1 
employed just one of many possible measures of justice beliefs, disadvantaged group 
membership, and motivation to pursue long-term goals, conclusions about this null effect, and 
the other effects in Study 1, require replication with other measures and greater experimental 
control. The next studies overcome these limitations by including more diverse 
operationalizations of the critical variables (Studies 2 through 7) and experimentally 
manipulating justice beliefs to test their causal relations (Studies 3, 4, 6 and 7).  
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CHAPTER 3: Socioeconomic status, justice beliefs and willingness to invest effort 
In Study 1, I found that the belief that the world is just – that is, a place in which people 
get what they deserve and deserve what they get – is positively associated with the motivation to 
pursue long-term goals, and that this is particularly true for members of disadvantaged groups. In 
Study 2 I sought to test the generalizability of this finding by using different measures of justice 
beliefs and motivation to pursue long-term goals. 
Specifically, rather than examining participants’ persistence in the face of poor 
performance as in Study 1, Study 2 investigated participants’ willingness to invest resources in 
pursuit of desirable long-term outcomes. Willingness to commit resources of time and energy to 
achieve a given end-state is a particularly relevant measure of motivation to pursue long-term 
goals. People find many end-states to be very desirable, but not everyone is equally willing or 
able to put in sufficient effort over time to achieve them. For example, many people may desire 
to look attractive in a swimsuit at the beach. However, not all of these individuals are motivated 
enough to expend the necessary effort – to eat fewer unhealthy foods and spend more time at the 
gym – to obtain this desired outcome. The same is true of career goals. If everyone could stroll 
into the nearest hospital and become a highly-paid surgeon tomorrow, without the grueling years 
of medical school, many more people would wield the scalpel. Thus, assessing people’s 
willingness to invest resources in pursuit of a goal offers a better sense of their motivation to 
achieve that goal than simply asking them to rate the desirability of the goal outcome (Atkinson, 
1957). Much as purchase intentions are seen as a closer predictor of actually owning a given 
product than are product evaluations (Armitage & Conner, 2001; Godin & Kok, 1996; Li & 
Petrick, 2008), people’s willingness to put in the required time, effort and material resources 
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over time to achieve a goal, as opposed to their evaluation of the goal’s end-state, provides a 
closer estimate of their motivation. 
Thus, in Study 2, I measured participants’ willingness to engage in the behaviors 
necessary to achieve various career goals. I first asked participants to rate their interest in a 
number of careers given the years of schooling and training required to obtain each career. I 
expected that participants’ answers would reflect two factors: Both (i) their willingness to invest 
resources in long-term goal pursuits, and (ii) the value they place on the specific rewarding 
careers themselves. For example, the response of a participant who indicated that she was not 
very interested in investing effort towards the goal of becoming a lawyer might reflect her 
general unwillingness to invest resources in pursuit of long-term goals, or it might also reflect 
her lack of specific interest in the law profession. Only the first factor is relevant to my 
hypotheses. To isolate this factor, I included another item, designed to purely measure the second 
factor – participants’ preferences for the specific careers. This item asked participants to rate 
how interested they would be in each of the careers if they could begin immediately, with no 
need to invest the time and energy usually required to attain the positions. By statistically 
partialling out participants’ interest in the specific rewarding careers, I was left with only their 
willingness to invest resources – a measure of motivation uncontaminated by idiosyncratic 
differences in preferences for specific careers.  
Participants in Study 2 completed this career interest measure immediately following a 
measure of chronic justice beliefs. Participants also completed a demographics questionnaire that  
measured SES. I predict that a strong positive relationship between justice beliefs and motivation 
to pursue long-term goals should emerge for low SES participants, and that a weaker relationship 
should emerge for high SES participants. However, given the results from Study 1, I was alert to 
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the possibility that this relationship would be not just weaker but absent among high SES 
participants. 
Method 
Participants. One hundred and eleven undergraduates (52 male, 59 female; mean age 
19.7 years) participated in this study in exchange for course credit. 
Procedure. Participants completed the study online by answering a survey containing 
questions about participants’ subjective SES, their justice beliefs, and their motivation to pursue 
long-term goals. The same subjective socioeconomic status item used in Study 1 served as the 
group membership measure, and was among other demographics items. Next, Lipkus’ (1991) 
eight-item Global Belief in a Just World (BJW) scale assessed participants’ justice beliefs, a 
more widely-known measure than the one used in Study 1. This scale consists of eight items 
(Cronbach’s α = .90) rated on a six-point scale ranging from 1 (strong disagreement) to 6 (strong 
agreement). Sample items are “I feel that people get what they deserve” and “I feel that people 
who meet with misfortune have brought it on themselves”. 
After completing the BJW scale, participants completed the career interest measure, 
which assessed their willingness to invest resources in long-term goals. Participants saw a list of 
four professions (lawyer, stockbroker, politician, and company president), that pilot testing
3
 
                                                 
3
A separate sample of 45 participants was given a list of fifty professions, selected at random from those 
listed at http://online.onetcenter.org/, a popular job search website. Professions with which I thought my 
undergraduate participants would be completely unfamiliar (e.g., extruding and forming machine setter, control and 
valve installer and repairer, slot key person, etc.) were excluded in advance, leaving a list of 50 professions which I 
thought most students would recognize. Participants selected the professions they thought were desirable and highly-
regarded by others. We selected the professions used in the dependent measure from the top 20
th
 percentile of 
participants’ ratings; at least 60% of participants had selected each one as desirable and highly-regarded. 
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suggested were desirable and well-regarded. Participants rated their interest in completing the 
years of schooling typically required to practice each profession, and also rated their interest in 
pursuing each profession assuming they could start the next day, with no training required. The 
order of these two sets of questions was counterbalanced: Half of the participants first rated their 
interest in the professions assuming they could start the next day, while the other half first rated 
them taking into account the necessary schooling. Question order had no effect on results in this 
or subsequent studies, and is therefore not discussed further. To form the dependent measure, I 
partialled out participants’ ratings of their interest in each career from their ratings of their 
interest in investing efforts in order to achieve that particular career. Specifically, I used multiple 
regression to compute the unstandardized residuals, and then averaged these residuals across 
careers
4
. This measure yielded an internal consistent measure of participants generalized 
willingness to invest resources in pursuit of long-term goals (Cronbach’s α = .72). 
Results 
Means, standard deviations, and intercorrelations between the independent variables are 
presented in Table 3.  
 
 
                                                 
4
 I also conducted analyses using other statistical procedures aiming to remove the influence of participants’ 
interest in the particular careers we chose from their interest in investing resources in order to attain them. For 
instance, in one analysis I used participants’ interest in investing resources averaged across careers as the dependent 
measure, and conducted my analyses with their interest in the careers themselves, also averaged across careers, 
entered as a covariate. In another analysis I computed a difference score (interest in investing resources minus 
interest in the careers themselves, averaged across careers) to serve as the dependent measure. In all cases, results 
were very similar. I chose to report the analyses using residualized scores, because it is the only method that allows 
me to report both an appropriate index of reliability and adjusted means that are readily interpretable. 
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Table 3              
Means, standard deviations, and intercorrelations of independent variables (Study 2)     
 Descriptives Correlation 
 Mean (SD) SES     
Socioeconomic status (SES) 4.24 (0.78) - 
Belief in Just World (BJW) 3.48 (0.92) .02     
t 
p < .10 * p < .05 ** p < .01 
 
I predicted that participants’ motivation to invest resources towards long-term goals 
would be greater to the extent that they believed in justice, and that this relationship would be 
especially strong among participants who reported lower SES. To test this prediction, I used 
multiple regression, with centered scores for subjective SES and BJW, as well as the two-way 
interaction, predicting willingness to invest resources in long-term goals (See Table 4). I 
predicted that a significant interaction would emerge
5
. 
Table 4              
Unstandardized regression coefficients for predictors of participants’ motivation (Study 2)    
Predictor Unstandardized SE Conf. Int. (95%) t
a
 p-value 
 Coefficient (B)       
Subjective SES -0.01 0.11 (-0.22, 0.21) 0.06 .44 
BJW 0.23 0.10 (0.03, 0.42) 2.27 .03 
SES X BJW -0.29 0.13 (-0.54, -0.04) 2.27 .03   
a
 The degrees of freedom are 38. 
 
This analysis revealed a main effect of BJW, such that overall, the more participants 
believed in societal justice, the greater their motivation, β = .23, t(107) = 2.27, p < .03. However, 
consistent with my prediction, this main effect was completely qualified by a significant 
interaction between BJW and SES, β = -.23, t(107) = 2.27, p < .03 (see Figure 2). I probed this 
                                                 
5
 For this study and all subsequent studies, for ease of presentation, I converted the within-cell means, 
which reflected an average of residualized scores, back into adjusted means. I did this by adding to each cell mean 
the interest in investing resources predicted by the mean  level of interest in the careers themselves, as indicated by 
the regression equations obtained during the calculation of the dependent measure. The number obtained thus 
reflects, for each cell, the average rating of interest participants reported in investing resources in the desirable 
careers, adjusted for their interest in the careers themselves. 
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interaction by comparing the simple slopes relating justice beliefs to willingness to invest 
resources in long-term goals among higher and lower SES participants, where higher and lower 
SES were defined as being one standard deviation above and below the mean, respectively. As 
expected, among participants low in SES, BJW scores strongly predicted willingness to invest 
resources in long-term goals, β = .47, t(107) = 2.71, p < .01. Among participants high in SES, 
however, this relationship did not emerge, β = .00, t(107) < 1, ns. Consistent with my hypothesis, 
lower SES students’ motivation was stronger to the extent that they believed in the general 
justice of society. In contrast, as in Study 1, this relationship was absent among higher SES 
students. 
Figure 2. Relationship of participants’ willingness to invest effort in long-term goals and justice beliefs, depending 




Study 2 provides a conceptual replication of Study 1. People who viewed themselves as 
low SES reported more willingness to invest resources in their long-term goals to the extent that 
they believed that the world is just. This relationship was absent among people who viewed 
themselves as high SES. Study 2 also involved a different measure of motivation to pursue long-
term goals (willingness to invest resources), which speaks to the generalizability of the effect. 
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It is surprising, given the strong theoretical precedent for thinking that justice beliefs 
motivate long-term goal pursuit, that I have twice found socially advantaged groups to be 
unconcerned with societal justice when considering how much to invest in their long-term goals. 
I predicted advantaged groups to show a weaker relationship between justice beliefs and goal 
pursuit, but not necessarily no relationship. However, it may be the relatively abstract notion of 
societal injustice, which is not attached to any particular domain or individual, which members 
of advantaged groups fail to consider in the context of goal pursuit, because societal injustice 
may not appear to them to be personally relevant. There may be other ways to describe injustice 
that might be seen by these individuals as more relevant – either by emphasizing that injustice is 
likely to affect them, or by making the injustice relevant to their specific goals – which might 
then influence their motivation. In any case, I note that motivating goal pursuit is but one of a 
number of functions fulfilled by justice beliefs (e.g., see Dalbert, 2002; Lind & Tyler, 1988; van 
den Bos & Lind, 2002; van Prooijen, 2009). So in no way should my results be interpreted as 
indicating that members of advantaged groups have no motivation to care about societal 
injustice.   
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CHAPTER 4: Ethnic status, induced justice beliefs and willingness to invest effort 
In two studies, I found consistent evidence that for members of disadvantaged groups, 
beliefs in societal justice are positively associated with the motivation to pursue long-term goals. 
In Studies 3 and 4, I studied a different type of disadvantaged group. I suggest that members of 
any socially disadvantaged group should more readily draw personal implications from their 
beliefs about societal justice, and therefore should be especially attuned to justice beliefs when 
planning goal directed behavior. Most social groups possess a variety of features that can 
distinguish them from the rest of the population (Betancourt & Lopez, 1993; Snibbe & Markus, 
2005). My use of pre-existing socioeconomic status as a marker of disadvantage is thus both a 
strength and a weakness. The resulting applicability of my findings to the real world constitutes a 
strength of this strategy.  However, low SES individuals possess a number of unique 
characteristics beyond social disadvantage, and any one of those features could have been the 
crucial moderator of the justice-motivation link. I believe that low SES participants calibrated 
their motivation to their justice beliefs because their group is chronically disadvantaged. But I 
cannot rule out the possibility that the crucial moderator is some other distinguishing 
characteristic of individuals with low SES; for example political orientation, religious beliefs, or 
cultural values. 
To address these alternative explanations, I sought to test the generalization of this effect 
beyond socioeconomic measures of group membership. To this end, Studies 3 and 4 examined 
the moderating role of ethnic minority status. Members of ethnic minority groups may differ 
from individuals with low socioeconomic status in a number of important ways; nonetheless, one 
feature common to both types of individuals is membership in a group which is socially 
disadvantaged. Thus, if ethnic minority group members show the same tendency as individuals 
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with low SES to calibrate their long-term goal motivation to their justice beliefs, I can be 
increasingly confident that the conceptually important variable is indeed membership in a 
disadvantaged group.  
In Studies 3 and 4, I also used an experimental paradigm, which would allow me to 
explore the causal nature of the relationship between societal justice beliefs and long-term goal 
motivation. By manipulating justice beliefs and assessing the effects on the motivation to pursue 
long-term goals, I can ensure that the correlational effects I uncovered in Studies 1 and 2 could 
not be completely accounted for by alternatives to my hypothesis. Participants in Study 3 first 
read either a justice passage (describing that justice in Canada is improving) or a control passage 
(describing that living conditions for a rare animal species were improving). They then 
completed a brief demographics form, which included the critical question about ethnicity, and 
then finally they completed the same career interest measure employed in Study 2. I predicted 
that ethnic minority participants who read the justice passage would be more willing to invest 
resources in pursuit of a desirable, well-regarded profession. For ethnic majority participants, 
although my initial hypothesis predicted a significant but weaker effect of justice beliefs on 
willingness to invest effort in long-term goals, in light of results from Studies 1 and 2, it seemed 
likely that this effect would be absent for ethnic majority participants. 
Method 
Participants. Seventy-four undergraduates (29 male, 44 female, 1 gender unspecified; 
Mage = 21.0 years) participated in this study. They volunteered to participate in exchange for 
course credit. Forty-seven participants belonged to the ethnic majority (defined as European-
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Canadian) and 27 belonged to ethnic minority groups (2 Arabic, 1 Hispanic, 14 East Asian, 1 
Hispanic, and 8 South Asian).
6
 
Procedure. Participants were led to believe that the purpose of the study was to examine 
the attention students pay to current events. Participants completed the study online, where they 
first read an article, ostensibly taken from a major daily newspaper, which constituted my 
manipulation of justice beliefs
7
. Half of the participants – those in the justice condition – read an 
article that described improving conditions of justice in their country. The other half – those in 
the control condition - read an article that also had a positive and optimistic message, but which 
was irrelevant to justice. Specifically, they read about improving conditions for a rare species of 
tree frog (See Appendix C for the text of both articles.) In keeping with the cover story about the 
purpose of the study all participants then answered some reading comprehension questions about 
the current events story that they read.  
                                                 
6
Reflecting the typical composition of my university’s undergraduate population, the ethnic minority 
category in this study and in Study 4 was highly diverse, including students from a number of different backgrounds, 
but predominately South and East Asian. Nation-level data indicates that Asian ethnic groups are indeed not only 
historically but currently disadvantaged groups in Canada (NARCC, 2007). 
7
 A separate sample of 33 participants read one of the two articles, and completed two measures relating to 
their beliefs in societal justice. These measures included a) Kay and Jost’s (2003) eight-item system satisfaction 
measure (sample item: Society is set up so that people usually get what they deserve; response provided on a 7-point 
scale ranging from 1 [strongly disagree] to 7 [strongly agree] ), and b) a one-item measure of societal justice beliefs 
(“how optimistic are you about the future of fairness in Canada?”; response provided on a 7-point scale ranging 
from 1 [not at all optimistic] to 7 [extremely optimistic). On both of these measures, participants who read the justice 
article reported stronger fairness beliefs than participants who read the control article (system satisfaction: Mjustice 
article = 5.64, SDjustice article = 1.40; Mcontrol article = 4.54, SDcontrol article = 1.14; t(31) = 2.44, p = .02; one-item measure: 
Mjustice article = 4.78, SDjustice article = 1.22; Mcontrol article = 3.73, SDcontrol article = 1.53; t(31) = 2.18, p = .04). 
34 
 
Following the manipulation, participants completed a demographics questionnaire, which 
included an open-ended question about their ethnicity (“What is your ethnicity?”). I used 
responses to categorize participants into socially advantaged (i.e., ethnic majority, defined as 
European-Canadian) and socially disadvantaged (ethnic minority). The experimenter then told 
participants we wanted to see how various personal characteristics might influence their attention 
to current events, and asked them to complete the career interest measure, which assessed their 
willingness to invest resources in long-term goals, with scores computed in the same way as in 
Study 2 (Cronbach’s α = .74). 
Results 
I predicted that ethnic minority participants would report higher willingness to invest 
resources in long-term goals when they were exposed to the justice passage as compared to the 
control passage. In contrast, on the strength of the results from Studies 1 and 2, I predicted that 
this relationship would not appear among ethnic majority participants. To test these predictions, I 
submitted participants’ scores on the computed measure of willingness to invest resources to a 
two-way ANOVA, with condition (justice vs. control) and ethnic status (ethnic majority vs. 
ethnic minority) as between-subjects factors. 
The analysis revealed a main effect of condition, such that overall, participants who had 
just read about improving societal justice showed greater motivation (adjusted M = 2.80, SD = 
1.10), compared to those who had just read a control article (adjusted M = 2.41, SD = 0.72), F(1, 
70) = 6.12, p < .02, η
2
p = .08. However as illustrated in Figure 3 the predicted interaction 
qualified this effect, F(1, 70) = 6.25, p < .02, η
2
p = .08. Ethnic majority participants were 
virtually unaffected by the manipulation, F(1, 70) < 1, ns, with those in the justice condition 
being just as willing to invest in long-term goals (adjusted M = 2.45, SD = 0.91) as those in the 
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control condition (adjusted M = 2.45, SD = 0.70). In contrast, ethnic minority participants 
showed greater willingness to invest in long-term goals in the justice passage condition (adjusted 
Mjustice = 3.36, SDjustice = 1.07) than in the control condition (adjusted Mcontrol = 2.25, SDcontrol = 
0.74), F(1, 70) = 9.79, p < .003, d = 1.21. Viewed from another angle, in the control condition 
ethnic majority and minority participants showed a similar degree of willingness to invest in 
long-term goals, F(1, 70) < 1, ns, while in the justice condition, ethnic minority participants 
reported greater willingness than ethnic majority participants, F(1, 70) = 9.82, p < .003, d = 0.92. 




I have hypothesized that justice beliefs function to enhance motivation to pursue long-
term goals, especially among members of socially disadvantaged groups. Study 3’s experimental 
design built on the findings of Studies 1 and 2 by providing evidence that justice beliefs play a 
causal role in shaping motivation for members of disadvantaged groups. After reading that 
Canadian society was becoming increasingly just, ethnic minority participants’ motivation to 
pursue long-term goals was increased (relative to reading an irrelevant control article). As in 
Studies 1 and 2, advantaged (in this case, ethnic majority) participants’ motivation was unrelated 
to justice beliefs. Study 3 also involved a different set of social groups, which is important given 
that I hypothesize that my predictions should extend to members of any disadvantaged group. 
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It is also worth noting that in the control condition, ethnic majority and minority 
participants showed a similar degree of willingness to invest in long-term goals, and that a boost 
to justice beliefs actually increased ethnic minority participants’ motivation to a level higher than 
that of ethnic majority participants (this pattern of means is also observed in Study 4). Although 
this finding rules out the possibility that my results can be explained by a ceiling effect, whereby 
the justice manipulation failed to increase the motivation of advantaged group members because 
they are already motivated to a maximal degree, one might expect that, at baseline conditions, 
the motivation of ethnic minority group members would be lower than that of ethnic majority 
group members. My hypotheses, however, focused on the extent to which members of socially 
advantaged and disadvantaged groups would be differentially attuned to justice beliefs, not on 
absolute differences between these groups. As Biernat and her colleagues (Biernat & Manis, 
1994; Biernat, Manis, & Nelson, 1991) have noted, it is problematic to compare scores between 
members of different groups using the type of scales I used here, because of shifting standards: 
The same point on a scale might have one meaning for a member of one group and another for a 
member of another group. 
Alternatively, the main effect difference in willingness to sacrifice may be due to cultural 
differences between social groups. It may be the case that the members of socially disadvantaged 
groups in my sample were predisposed to invest effort in order to achieve long-term goals.  
Importantly, this cultural explanation would not account for my main finding, whereby members 
of socially disadvantaged groups were more sensitive to justice information when making 
investments in their long-term goals. Thus, what is meaningful, despite shifting standards and 
cultural differences, is to consider how the motivation of members within the different groups 
varies as a function of justice beliefs, as I have done here. 
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CHAPTER 5: The mediating role of perceptions of personal just treatment 
In Study 4, I aimed to replicate the experimentally-obtained results of Study 3 using a 
different manipulation, and also to directly test my hypothesized mechanism. To achieve these 
aims, I altered the design of Study 3 in two important ways. First, I used a more subtle priming 
methodology (McCoy & Major, 2007) to activate the notion of justice, instead of the direct, 
explicit beliefs manipulation used in Study 3. The use of such a procedure eliminates demand 
characteristics, and convergent results would suggest that the results from Study 3 could not be 
entirely explained by participants’ beliefs about the experimenter’s expectations regarding how 
they should respond to justice information. 
Second, I included a potential mediating variable in Study 4. I hypothesized that 
members of socially disadvantaged groups are more attuned to justice information when setting 
goals because they are more concerned that they might personally be affected by societal 
injustice, as compared to members of advantaged groups. In other words, I hypothesized that the 
general justice beliefs of members of socially disadvantaged groups would influence their long-
term goal motivation indirectly through their personal justice beliefs (see Lipkus, 1991). To add 
substance to this speculation, Study 4 tests whether beliefs about personal (un)just treatment 
mediate the link between societal justice beliefs and motivation. After the justice manipulation, 
participants rated three items designed to measure their beliefs about their own likelihood of 
unjust treatment. I expected that priming the abstract concept of justice would decrease the 
extent to which ethnic minority participants’ believe that they are or could be treated unjustly, 
and that this decrease would produce greater motivation, as reflected by greater willingness to 





Participants. Ninety-one undergraduates (24 male, 67 female; Mage = 18.8 years) 
participated in this study in exchange for course credit. Thirty-nine participants belonged to the 
ethnic majority (defined as European-Canadian) and 52 belonged to ethnic minority groups (6 
Arabic, 3 Black, 32 East Asian, 1 Hispanic, and 10 South Asian). 
Procedure. Participants completed the study online, where they first encountered a 
demographics questionnaire, which included an open-ended question about their ethnicity 
(“What is your ethnicity?”). I used responses to categorize participants as either ethnic majority 
or ethnic minority. Participants then completed a scrambled sentence task, which served as the 
priming manipulation. I used materials developed by McCoy and Major (2007) to prime what 
they term a meritocratic ideology, or the belief that outcomes are distributed justly, based on 
merit (e.g., “effort positive prosperity leads to,” and “people are merit judge on,” could 
respectively be unscrambled into “effort leads to prosperity,” and “judge people on merit;” see 
Appendix D for full list of sentences). All participants read 20 sets of 5 words, and had to use 4 
of the 5 words from each set to form a grammatically correct English sentence. The instructions 
required them to spend approximately 5 minutes on the task. 
After completing the scrambled sentence task
8
, participants completed a measure of 
personal (in)justice beliefs—that is, a measure of the extent to which they believed that they 
were currently, or might in the future be treated unjustly. Specifically, participants used a seven-
point scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 7 (extremely) to answer the three following questions: 
                                                 
8
 A separate sample of 49 participants completed one of the two scrambled sentence tasks and then 
completed a one-item measure of societal justice beliefs (“How optimistic are you about the future of fairness in 
Canada?”). Participants who completed the justice version of the task reported stronger justice beliefs (M = 5.35, SD 
= 0.79) than participants who completed the control version of the task (M = 4.75, SD = 0.95); t(47) = 2.24, p = .03). 
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“How likely do you think it is that you will suffer negative consequences due to unfairness at 
some point in your life?” and “To what extent do you feel that people like you are treated 
differently than they would be in a perfectly fair world?”. Participants’ responses to these 
questions were averaged together to form a single index of their beliefs about personal unjust 
treatment, r = .54; and I reverse-scored the index into a measure of beliefs about personal just 
treatment, for ease of presentation. Finally, participants completed the same career interest 
measure, and an index of general willingness to invest resources in long-term goals was 
computed in the same way, as in Studies 2 and 3 (Cronbach’s α = .70). 
Results 
Replicating Study 3. I predicted that ethnic minority participants would report more 
willingness to invest effort in long-term goals after the justice prime than after the control prime, 
but, based on the balance of results from Studies 1 through 3, that this relationship would not 
appear among ethnic majority participants. To test this prediction, I subjected participants’ 
computed scores of general willingness to invest resources in long-term goals to a two-way 
ANOVA, with priming condition (justice prime vs. no prime) and ethnic status (ethnic majority 
vs. ethnic minority) as between-subject factors.  
The only significant effect to emerge from this analysis was the predicted interaction 
between priming condition and ethnicity, F(1, 87) = 7.68, p < .01, η
2
p = .08. Ethnic majority 
participants did not show a reliable effect of the manipulation; indeed, their responses revealed a 
marginally significant pattern in the opposite direction, such that they showed less willingness to 
invest when justice was primed (adjusted M = 2.76, SD = 0.68) than when justice was not primed 
(adjusted M = 3.08, SD = 0.87) F(1, 87) = 3.49, p < .07, d = 0.41. In contrast, as predicted, ethnic 
minority participants showed more willingness to invest when justice was primed (adjusted M = 
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3.54, SD = 0.72) than when justice was not primed (adjusted M = 3.04, SD = 0.75), F(1, 87) = 
4.33, p = .04, d = 0.68.   
Mediational analysis. I also predicted that the extent to which ethnic minority 
participants thought they were or could be in the future treated unjustly would mediate the 
effects of the justice prime on their willingness to invest effort in long-term goals. More 
precisely, my prediction corresponds to a moderated mediation model, where the link between 
justice condition (the independent variable) and beliefs about personal just treatment (the 
mediator) is moderated by participants’ ethnic status. 
I tested this multiple regression using the procedure recommended by Preacher, Rucker 
and Hayes (2007), and their MODMED (Model 2) syntax. I first conducted a regression using 
condition (0 = control; 1 = justice), ethnic status (0 = ethnic minority; 1 = ethnic majority), and 
their interaction to predict beliefs about personal unjust treatment. Consistent with my 
predictions, the interaction (marginally) significantly predicted beliefs about unjust treatment, B 
= -0.82, SE = 0.47, t(87) = 1.76, p = .08. The sign of this interaction suggests that, as predicted 
the justice condition increased beliefs about personal just treatment to a greater extent for ethnic 
minority participants, relative to ethnic majority participants. A second regression then used the 
same predictors plus beliefs about personal just treatment (centered) to predict motivation. In this 
analysis, the condition X ethnic status interaction (which had a significant effect on motivation in 
the ANOVA described above) emerged as only marginal, B = -0.94, SE = 0.56, t(86) = 1.68, p = 
.10, and beliefs about personal just treatment positively predicted motivation, B = 0.24, SE = 
0.13, t(86) = 1.90, p = .05. 
To summarize, ethnic status moderated the effect of condition on beliefs about personal 
just treatment, and including the latter variable as a mediator in the model appeared to reduce the 
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direct effect of the condition X ethnic status interaction on motivation. The combination of these 
two findings confirms my prediction of moderated mediation. The indirect effect of condition on 
motivation (through beliefs about personal just treatment) among ethnic minority participants 
was significant, CI(95) = [0.005, 0.48], but not significant for ethnic majority participants, 
CI(95) = [-0.19, 0.10]. The results of this meditational analysis for ethnic minority participants 
are displayed in Figure 4. Thus, beliefs about personal unjust treatment mediated the effect of 
priming condition on ethnic minorities’ motivation to achieve rewarding careers. 
Figure 4. Mediation model showing the direct effect of a justice prime on willingness to invest effort in long-term 




Study 4 replicated the effect found across the first three studies using a subtle 
manipulation of justice beliefs: Priming the abstract concept of justice using a scrambled 
sentence methodology led ethnic minority (but not ethnic majority) participants to express an 
increased willingness to invest resources in their long-term goals. In addition, a mediational 
analysis tested the mechanism of this effect, and found that the justice prime decreased ethnic 
minority participants’ beliefs that they were and would continue to be treated unjustly, which in 
turn led to greater willingness to invest efforts in long-term goals. In contrast, this effect was not 
reproduced among ethnic majority participants. Importantly, a manipulation check conducted by 
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McCoy and Major (2007) demonstrated that the priming manipulation I used was effective in 
influencing ethnic majority participants’ beliefs about societal injustice. Thus, my results are 
unlikely to have emerged because these ethnic majority participants were simply insensitive to 
the priming manipulation: Like ethnic minority participants, they felt that society was more just 
following the prime (McCoy & Major, 2007). Unlike ethnic minority participants, however, in 
the present study ethnic majority participants’ beliefs about their own personal just treatment 
were unaffected by the prime. Taken together, these results suggest there is a disconnect between 
advantaged group members’ beliefs about societal injustice and their beliefs about their own 
personal outcomes. 
I predicted and found that the more members of disadvantaged groups believe in societal 
justice, the more they believe in their own personal just treatment, and thus the more motivated 
they are to pursue long-term goals. In contrast, neither previously-held beliefs about societal 
justice (Studies 1 and 2), nor manipulations which increased them (Studies 3 and 4) had any 
bearing on the motivation of members of advantaged groups. But what of the beliefs that these 
individuals hold about their own personal just treatment? A regression analysis revealed no 
evidence that ethnic majority members’ beliefs about personal just treatment predicted their 
motivation, β = .06, t(35) < 1, ns. As mentioned in the discussion of Study 2, this may be due to 
the general nature of my just treatment items. These items concerned just and unjust treatment in 
the abstract, with no reference to a specific context. It may be that members of advantaged 
groups only view justice information as relevant to their goal pursuit if the justice information is 
tied to the specific goal in question. In other words, it may be that members of advantaged 
groups only view justice information if it is made directly relevant both to them and to their 
specific goal pursuits. If this were true, then had I measured beliefs about personal just treatment 
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in career domains, I might have found that this measure predicted career motivation even among 
members of the ethnic majority. 
Unexpectedly, the justice prime marginally impacted the motivation of members of 
ethnic majority participants in the reverse direction. It is possible that members of advantaged 
groups see desired outcomes as more attainable in an unjust world, because they know that 
injustice might prevent some qualified others from competing with them for these outcomes. 
However, given the inconsistency of this effect – it attained only marginal significance, and in 
only one out of four studies thus far – I am not confident that this is a meaningful result. 
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CHAPTER 6: A global perspective: Archival data from the World Values Survey 
In Study 5, I used data from the World Values Survey to test my main hypothesis in a 
sample that spans the globe. Because, on average, the university students in my previous studies 
might be expected to be more advantaged than the average citizen, and because ethnic minority 
or low SES university students may differ in a number of ways from members of other 
disadvantaged groups, it is important to test my hypotheses with a broader sample. Thus, in 
Study 5, I aim to conceptually replicate the findings from the earlier studies in a broad sample 
with different operationalizations of justice beliefs and investment in goals. In addition, because 
of the rich information about respondents available in the WVS, using this data set allows me to 
control for various factors that could potentially be confounded with membership in a 
disadvantaged group or with the motivation to pursue long-term goals. For example, these data 
allow me to better isolate disadvantage from other associated variables, such as group differences 
in political views or religious beliefs. 
The WVS contains a wealth of items that could potentially be relevant to either justice 
beliefs, disadvantaged group membership, and the motivation to pursue long-term goals. In the 
analyses I report, I focus on the available items that most closely match the conceptualizations of 
the three variables used in the present research. To measure justice beliefs, I used items that 
assess individuals’ belief in meritocratic justice, or the notion that hard work is rewarded with 
success. To measure membership in disadvantaged groups, I used two different items. First, I 
used a subjective item asking respondents to identify their social class. Second, I used 
respondents’ ethnicity. Because certain ethnicities might be advantaged in some parts of the 
world but disadvantaged in others, I restricted this latter analysis to citizens of nations where 
Caucasians formed the largest ethnic group. In such nations, the Caucasian group is typically 
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relatively advantaged, whereas the non-Caucasian groups are typically relatively disadvantaged. 
To measure motivation to pursue long-term goals, I used items that assessed individuals’ 
prioritization of hard work, over other activities such as leisure. Indeed, willingness to sacrifice 
relaxation and enjoyment is considered a necessary component of long-term goal pursuit and a 
hallmark feature of self-regulation (Atkinson, 1957; Bargh et al., 2001; Fishbach, Friedman, & 
Kruglanski, 2003). I chose to assess work motivation because it seems most clearly linked with 
meritocratic justice, compared with other common domains of motivation (like health and 
relationships), which may be less obviously related to societal justice.  
I predicted that self-reported social class would moderate the relation between justice 
beliefs and motivation, such that those lower in social class would most strongly calibrate their 
effort investment to their beliefs in societal justice. I also predicted that ethnic status would 
moderate the relation between justice beliefs and motivation, such that non-Caucasian minority 
respondents would most strongly calibrate their effort investment to their beliefs in societal 
justice, compared to Caucasian majority respondents. I also predicted that both patterns of 
moderation would hold when controlling for other individual difference variables that could 
covary with my variables of interest. Finally, because in this study I had a large sample and 
measures of both social class and ethnicity, I was able to test whether the effects of each were 
independent of each other. Because ethnic minorities tend to have lower socioeconomic status 
than ethnic majorities, it could be that the results of Studies 3 and 4 occurred as a result of the 
lower SES of ethnic minorities in the sample, or, conversely, it could be that the results of 
Studies 1 and 2 occurred because many of the students who reported lower SES were ethnic 
minorities. To test whether both social class and ethnic status independently moderate the justice 
beliefs – motivation link, I examined the moderating role of social class separately among both 
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ethnic minority and ethnic majority groups, and the moderating role of ethnic status separately at 
all levels of social class. 
Method 
Data for this study came from the second wave of the World Values Survey. These 
surveys were conducted by face-to-face interviews between 1994 and 1999, and the samples are 
designed to be approximately representative of the relevant country’s populations (see Inglehart 
et al., 2004, for a more detailed description of datasets typical of this survey). I present results 
from this particular wave because it was the only wave that contained all the items relevant to 
my hypothesis. 
Participants. The variables that were relevant to the present study (described below) 
were available for 53,394 individuals from 49 countries
9
. Their mean age was 40.9 years (range 
= 15 to 95); see Table 5 for all other demographics. 
 
 
                                                 
9
Specifically, the sample consisted of participants from the following countries (stars represent countries 
where Caucasians represented the largest ethnic group in the sample): Albania (N = 820), Argentina* (N = 840), 
Armenia (N = 1629), Australia* (N = 1635), Azerbaijan (N = 1522), Bangladesh (N = 1299), Belarus (N = 1662), 
Bosnia and Herzegovina (N = 983), Brazil* (N = 1090), Bulgaria* (N = 702), Chile* (N = 897), China (N =1176), 
Croatia (N = 895), Czech Republic (N = 915), Dominican republic (N = 377), Estonia (N = 871), Finland* (N =724), 
Georgia* (N = 1734), Germany* (N = 1321), Hungary (N =538), India (N = 1462), Japan (N = 611), Latvia (N = 
964), Lithuania (N = 821), Macedonia (N = 733), Mexico (N = 1925), Moldova (N = 898), New Zealand (N = 714), 
Nigeria (N = 1546), Norway (N = 916), Pakistan (N = 434), Peru (N = 1005), Philippines (N = 1150), Poland* (N = 
760), Puerto Rico (N = 1050), Romania* (N = 978), Russian Federation (N = 1607), Serbia and Montenegro (N = 
1266), Slovakia (N = 943), Slovenia* (N = 791), South Africa* (N = 2279), Spain* (N =921), Sweden* (N = 661), 
Taiwan (N = 644), Turkey (N = 1668), Ukraine* (N = 2081), United States* (N = 1120), Uruguay* (N = 838), 
Venezuela (N =978). 
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Table 5              
Demographics for the World Values Survey sample (Study 5)        
 N %    
Gender Female 27,253 51.0 
 Male 26,086 48.9    
Ethnicity Arabic 4,017 7.5 
Black 4,384 8.2 
Caucasian 19,060 35.7 
East Asian 1,249 2.3 
South Asian 1,868 3.5 
Southeast Asian 1,141 2.1 
Mixed ethnicity 1,231 2.3 
Other 1,819 3.4 
  (Not specified) (18,625) (34.9)    
Social class Lower 6,213 11.6 
Working 16,234 30.5 
Lower middle 20,967 39.3 
Upper middle 8,999 16.9 
 Upper 931 1.7    
Highest level of education Incomplete elementary 4,432 8.3 
Complete elementary 7,342 13.8 
Incomplete secondary 9,350 17.5 
Complete secondary 18,988 35.6 
Some university 3,568 6.7 
University with degree 7,918 14.8 
  (Not specified) (1,796) (3.4)    
Current employment status Full-time 19,637 36.8 
Part-time 3,888 7.3 
Self-employed 4,509 8.4 
Retired 7,479 14.0 
Homemaker 5,838 10.9 
Student 3,366 6.3 
Unemployed 4,639 8.7 
Other 1,053 2.0 
  (Not specified) (2,985) (5.6)    
 
Summary of procedure. In the WVS, I found items that allowed me to compute indices 
for my independent variables (societal justice beliefs, social class, and ethnic status), my 
dependent variable (motivation to pursue long-term goals), and a series of control variables. I 
used these variables to conduct two different sets of tests. First, I tested the hypothesis that social 
class would moderate the relation between justice beliefs and motivation, and verified that the 
pattern of moderation held up even when I included the control variables, and among members 
of both Caucasian majority and non-Caucasian minority groups. Then, I tested the hypothesis 
that ethnic status would moderate the relation between justice beliefs and motivation, and 
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verified that the pattern of moderation held up even when I included the control variables, and 
among respondents at all levels of social class. 
Independent variables. I used items from the WVS to create measures of societal justice 
beliefs, membership in a socially disadvantaged group, and prioritization of work over leisure. I 
used three items to compute scores for societal justice beliefs, or the extent to which respondents 
believed that outcomes are distributed as a function of merit. One item asked respondents to use 
a 1-to-10 scale to rate their beliefs about the efficacy of hard work (1 = “In the long run, hard 
work usually brings a better life” and 10 = “Hard work doesn’t generally bring success – it’s 
more a matter of luck and connections”). Two additional items asked respondents to indicate 
which of two opinions about the poor were closest to their view. Respondents chose one of the 
following two options to explain why some people are poor: “because of laziness and lack of 
willpower” (score of 1), or “because of an unfair society” (score of 2). They then chose one of 
the following two options regarding the chances that the poor have of escaping poverty: “they 
have a chance” (score of 1) or “they have very little chance” (score of 2). I reverse scored all 
three items such that higher scores indicated stronger beliefs in societal justice. I then 
standardized the items to make them comparable, and averaged them together to form a 





                                                 
10
 In the interests of thoroughness, I also examined the WVS dataset for items that might measure other 
conceptions of justice beliefs. Respondents indicated their confidence in institutions designed to ensure a fair 
society, such as the justice system, courts, and government. They also indicated their happiness with the political 
system now as compared with ten years ago (a good parallel to my manipulation of justice in Study 3). Because I 
believe that meritocracy beliefs most closely match my conceptualization of societal justice beliefs, I report analyses 
using respondents’ endorsement of meritocracy as my measure of societal justice beliefs. However, it may be useful 
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I used two measures of disadvantaged group membership. First I used respondents’ 
reports of their social class. In this measure interviewers told respondents “people sometimes 
describe themselves as belonging to the working class, the middle class, or the upper or lower 
class.” Respondents then reported their own social class using a 5-point scale (1 = upper class, 2 
= upper middle class, 3 = lower middle class, 4 = working class, 5 = lower class). I reverse 
scored this item such that higher scores indicated higher class
11
. 
I also used ethnic minority status as a measure of membership in a disadvantaged group. 
Given that the WVS uses samples designed to be at least approximately representative of each 
country’s population, I searched for countries where Caucasians represented the largest ethnic 
group contained in the sample. Of the countries where the WVS measured respondents’ 
ethnicity, I identified 17 where this was the case (see footnote 9). Wherever possible, I used the 
full array of countries, but in all analyses involving ethnic status I restricted my analyses to these 
countries. This procedure left me with a total of 14257 respondents for these analyses, of whom 
72.4% were Caucasian (ethnic majority) and 27.6% were non-Caucasian (ethnic minority). 
Dependent measure. To compute scores for motivation to pursue long-term goals, two 
relevant items were available in the WVS. Respondents rated how much they prioritize work vs. 
leisure or recreation, using a 5-point scale (1 = “it’s leisure that makes life worth living, not 
work” and 5 = “work is what makes life worth living, not leisure”). Respondents also rated the 
                                                                                                                                                             




 Respondents also indicated their household income on a scale with points tailored to each country’s 
typical household income, which represents economic status. All analyses reported here replicate when household 
income was substituted as the measure of membership in a disadvantaged group. 
50 
 
importance of work in their lives, using a 4-point scale (1= “very important” and 4 = “not at all 
important”). I reverse scored the second item such that higher scores indicated more 
prioritization of work. I then standardized the items to make them comparable, and averaged 
them together to form a composite index of prioritization of work, r = .19, p < .001.  
Control variables. I included a number of variables that could potentially be confounded 
with either group membership or motivation to work hard. As variables that could be confounded 
with group membership, I considered a measure of political views (1 = left, 9 = right, centered 
around 0 for analyses), and religiosity (1 = a convinced atheist, 2 = not a religious person, 3 = a 
religious person, centered around 0 for analyses; identical results were obtained using a 
continuous measure of religious participation as the covariate). As variables that could be 
confounded with motivation to work hard, I included respondents’ selection of “good pay” and 
“respected job” from a list of potential factors that they might find important when looking for a 
job (coded as 0 = not selected, 1 = selected). All analyses reported below were first conducted 
without the inclusion of any control variables. Those analyses were then repeated, including all 
the above-mentioned variables as covariates. 
Results 
Means, standard deviations and intercorrelations of the independent variables are 
presented in Table 6. I predicted that respondents who reported lower social class would show an 
especially strong relationship between their beliefs in societal justice and their willingness to 
make sacrifices to achieve long-term goals. I also predicted that non-Caucasian respondents 
living in countries where Caucasians formed the largest ethnic group would show an especially 
strong relationship between their beliefs in societal justice and their willingness to make 




Table 6             
Means, standard deviations, and intercorrelations of independent variables (Study 5) 
              
Sample for analyses that did not include ethnicity         
 Descriptives Correlations 
 N Mean (SD) 1 2 3 4 5  
1. Social class 53,394 2.67 (0.95) - - - - - 
2. Justice beliefs 53,594 0.00 (0.69) .13** - - - - 
3. Political views 42,509 5.60 (2.31) .09** .15** - - - 
4. Religiosity 50,173 2.67 (0.54) .00 .06** .13** - - 
5. Value: good pay 50,981 0.84 (0.36) -.02** -.06** .01* .00 - 
6. Value: respected job 50,681 0.51 (0.50) .03** .05** .09** .05** .13**  
t 
p < .10 * p < .05 ** p < .001 
          
Sample for analyses where ethnicity was a predictor         
 Descriptives Correlations 
 N Mean (SD) 1 2 3 4 5 6  
1. Ethnic status 14,257 0.72 (0.45) - - - - - - 
(1 = Caucasian; 0 = non-Caucasian) 
2. Social class 14,257 2.69 (0.96) .20** - - - - - 
3. Justice beliefs 14,257 0.00 (0.70) -.06** .10** - - - - 
4. Political views 12,148 5.43 (2.26) -.02* .09** .12** - - - 
5. Religiosity 13,985 2.69 (0.55) -.07** .02
t
 .09** .15** - - 
6. Value: good pay 11,978 0.79 (0.41) -.09** -.01 .00 .00 .01 - 




 .04* .08** .12** 
t 
p < .10 * p < .05 ** p < .001 
 
Moderating role of social class. I used the Aiken and West (1991) method for multiple 
regression, using centered scores for justice beliefs and social class, as well as their interaction, 
predicting prioritization of work, first with no covariates, and then adding each covariate 
separately, and then adding all the covariates together (see Table 7 for the regression coefficients 
from the first and last of these steps; see Table 8 for the simple slopes tests from each step 
separately). Given the similarity of the results across analyses, in the text I present results from 
the analysis with no covariates, which allowed me to use the full sample.  
As predicted, the interaction between justice beliefs and social class attained significance, 
β = -.012, t(53390) = 2.68, p < .01. I probed this interaction by examining the relationship 
between justice beliefs and prioritization of work at one standard deviation above and below the 
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mean of social class. These analyses revealed that justice beliefs positively predicted willingness 
to sacrifice to achieve long-term goals at both low, β =.12, t(53390) = 19.55, p < .0001, and high, 
β = .10, t(53390) = 16.28, p < .0001, social class. However, this relationship was strongest at low 
social class. 
Table 7              
Unstandardized regression coefficients for social-class-as-moderator analyses (Study 5)     
Predictor Unstandardized SE Conf. Int. (95%) t
a
 p-value 
 Coefficient (B)       
Social class -0.03 0.004 (-0.04, -0.02) 8.42 < .001 
Justice beliefs 0.12 0.11 (0.11, 0.13) 25.24 < .001 
Class X beliefs -0.02 0.005 (-0.02, -0.004) 2.68 .01   
Political views 0.01 0.002 (.01, .02) 8.54 < .001 
Religiosity 0.10 0.007 (.09, .11) 14.24 < .001 
Value: good pay 0.01 0.004 (.002, .02) 2.55 .01 
Value: respected job 0.08 0.004 (.07, .09) 20.20 < .001 
Social class -0.03 0.004 (-.04, -.02) 6.93 < .001 
Justice beliefs 0.09 0.006 (0.08, 0.10) 16.14 < .001 
Class X beliefs -0.01 0.006 (-0.03, -0.003) 2.18 .03   
a
 The degrees of freedom are 53390 for the upper panel; 39292 for the lower panel. 
Table 8              
Moderating role of social class – covariates (Study 5)        
 Interaction β t p  Justice beliefs β t p 
Covariate (class X beliefs)   Class     
    low .15 11.53 <. 001 
None .012 2.68 .008 middle .10 22.49 < .001 
    high -.01 1.70 .87  
    low .13 8.70 < .001 
Political views -.014 2.82 .005 middle .09 16.61 < .001 
    high -.05 1.26 .21  
    low .15 2.97 < .001 
Religiosity -.013 2.97 .003 middle .09 15.11 < .001 
    high -.003 .10 .92  
    low .14 10.42 < .001 
Value: good pay -.009 2.02 .04 middle .10 21.58 < .001 
    high .02 .43 .67  
    low .13 9.75 < .001 
Value: respected job -.008 1.85 .06 middle .10 20.59 < .001 
    high .01 .35 .72  
    low .11 6.87 < .001 
All -.011 2.18 .03 middle .09 15.11 < .001 
    high -.06 1.53 .10  
 
More strikingly, I conducted analyses separately at three levels of social class: The 
lowest, the highest and collapsing across the three middle levels. Figure 5 illustrates how the 
relationship between justice beliefs and the prioritization ranges from robust at the lowest social 
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class, β =.15, t(6211) = 11.53, p < .0001, to completely absent at the highest social class, β = -
.006, t(929) < 1, ns, with the intermediate social classes showing an intermediate sized 
relationship, β = .10, t(46248) = 22.49, p < .0001. 
Figure 5. Relationship between respondents’ willingness to make sacrifices to achieve long-term goals and their 
endorsement of meritocratic beliefs, for self-identified lower- and upper-class respondents. 
 
 
Finally, I repeated my analyses separately for Caucasian and non-Caucasian respondents, 
using respondents from countries where Caucasians formed the largest ethnic group. Results are 
summarized in Table 9. 
Table 9              
Class X beliefs interaction across majority( Caucasian) and minority (non-Caucasian) respondents (Study 5)  
 No covariates All covariates 
 β t df p β t df p  
Minority (non-Caucasian) -.03 3.52 3933 < .001 -.03 2.81 1845 .01  
Majority (Caucasian) -.013 2.10 10316 .04 -.011 2.02 8169 .04 
 
Whether I used no covariates or all covariates, I found that the class X belief interaction 
consistently and negatively predicted motivation across both Caucasians and non-Caucasians. 
Thus, social class moderates the justice belief – motivation link in the predicted fashion among 
both advantaged and disadvantaged ethnic groups. However, I did note that the effect appeared 
larger and more significant among ethnic minority respondents, compared to ethnic majority 
respondents. Thus, it may be that majority ethnic group status provides even individuals with low 
SES some degree of perceived immunity to societal injustice. 
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Moderating role of ethnic status. To test the second prediction, I again used the Aiken 
and West (1991) method for multiple regression, using centered scores for justice beliefs, 
dummy coded ethnicity (0 = non-Caucasian, 1 = Caucasian), and their interaction predicting 
prioritization of work, first with no covariates, and then adding each covariate separately, and 
then adding all the covariates together (see Table 10 for the regression coefficients from the first 
and last of these steps; see Table 11 for the simple slopes tests from each step separately). Given 
the similarity of the results across analyses, in the text I present results from the analysis with no 
covariates, which allowed me to use the full sample. This analysis was restricted to countries 
where Caucasians formed the largest ethnic group. 
Table 10             
Unstandardized regression coefficients for ethnic-status-as-moderator analyses (Study 5) 
              
Predictor Unstandardized SE Conf. Int. (95%) t
a
 p-value 
 Coefficient (B)       
Ethnic status -0.32 0.02 (-0.35, -0.29) 21.64 < .001 
Justice beliefs 0.12 0.02 (0.08, 0.16) 6.53 < .001 
Ethnicity X beliefs -0.12 0.02 (-0.16, -0.07) 5.44 < .001   
Political views 0.02 0.004 (0.01, 0.02) 4.48 .01 
Religiosity 0.07 0.01 (.04, 0.09) 5.05 < .001 
Value: good pay -0.03 0.01 (-0.05, -0.02) 4.52 < .001 
Value: respected job 0.06 0.01 (0.04, 0.07) 7.21 < .001 
Ethnic status -0.14 0.02 (-0.18, -0.10) 6.94 < .001 
Justice beliefs 0.08 0.02 (0.05, 0.13) 4.32 < .001 
Ethnicity X beliefs -0.10 0.02 (-0.14, -0.05) 4.45 < .001   
a
 The degrees of freedom are 14253 for the upper panel; 10022 for the lower panel. 
Table 11             
Moderating role of ethnic status – covariates (Study 5)        
 Interaction β t p  Justice beliefs β t p 
Covariate (ethnicity X beliefs)   Ethnicity 
         
None -.09 5.44 <.001 Caucasian .005 < 1 ns 
    Non-Caucasian .11 6.57 < .001 
Political views -.08 4.33 <.001 Caucasian -.001 < 1 ns 
    Non-Caucasian .09 5.00 < .001 
Religiosity -.09 5.82 <.001 Caucasian -.003 < 1 ns 
    Non-Caucasian .11 6.55 < .001 
Value: good pay -.07 3.41 <.001 Caucasian -.005 < 1 ns 
    Non-Caucasian .08 4.30 < .001 
Value: respected job -.07 3.57 <.001 Caucasian -.006 < 1 ns 
    Non-Caucasian .08 4.41 < .001 
All -.08 4.45 <.001 Caucasian -.008 < 1 ns 




As predicted, the interaction between justice beliefs and ethnicity attained significance, β 
= -.09, t(14253) = 5.71, p < .001. I probed this interaction by examining the relationship between 
justice beliefs and prioritization of work among Caucasians and non-Caucasians. These analyses 
revealed that justice beliefs positively predicted willingness to sacrifice to achieve long-term 
goals among non-Caucasians, β =.11, t(14253) =  6.57, p < .001, but not among Caucasians, β = 
.005, t(14253) < 1, ns. This relationship is depicted in Figure 6. 
Figure 6. Relationship between respondents’ willingness to make sacrifices to achieve long-term goals and their 
endorsement of meritocratic beliefs, for Caucasian and non-Caucasian respondents living in countries where 
Caucasians form the largest ethnic group 
 
 
Finally, I repeated my analyses separately for three levels of social class: The lowest, the 
highest and collapsing across the three middle levels. Results are summarized in Table 12.  
Table 12             
Ethnicity X beliefs interaction across levels of social class (Study 5)       
 No covariates All covariates 
 β t df p β t df p  
Lower class -.07 2.28 1685 .02 -.16 2.48 1284 .01  
Intermediate classes -.10 5.26 12366 <.001 -.11 4.16 10472 < .001 
Upper class -.05 0.30 194 .76 -.08 0.34 169 .73  
 
Whether I used no covariates or all covariates I found that respondents who reported that 
they belonged to the lower or middle classes showed an ethnicity X beliefs interaction consistent 
with my predictions. Unexpectedly, however, I found that respondents who reported that they 
belonged to the upper class did not. Thus, ethnic status moderates the justice belief – motivation 
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link in the predicted fashion among both lower and middle class individuals, but I did not find 
that relationship among upper class individuals. This null effect could have arisen because of the 
much smaller sample of upper class respondents, compared to the other categories. In support of 
this possibility, the non-significant interaction is in the predicted direction. Alternatively, it could 
be a true null effect. Very few respondents categorized themselves as upper class (only 2.2% in 
the overall sample), and it could be that participants’ whose socioeconomic background is so 
extremely privileged feel immune to societal injustice even when they belong to minority ethnic 
groups. This suggestion parallels the idea that being a member of the ethnic majority offers even 
individuals with low SES some degree of perceived immunity to social injustice. 
Discussion 
I have hypothesized that justice beliefs function to enhance motivation to pursue long-
term goals, especially among members of socially disadvantaged groups. In Studies 1 and 2, I 
found evidence that justice beliefs predict motivation to pursue long-term goals, and that this 
relationship was strong among participants low in SES, but non-existent among participants high 
in SES. In Studies 3 and 4, I found that this same relationship was strong among members of 
ethnic minority groups, but non-existent among members of ethnic majority groups. In Study 5, I 
replicated both of these findings using data from a cross-national sample containing a much 
wider range of relatively advantaged and disadvantaged groups. In this sample, justice beliefs 
continued to predict motivation to pursue long-term goals even among survey respondents who 
reported high social class, but the relationship was much stronger among respondents who 
reported low social class. Moreover, as in Studies 3 and 4, the relationship was strong among 
members of ethnic minority groups, but non-existent among members of ethnic majority groups. 
Importantly, the moderating role of social class held across both ethnic statuses, and the 
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moderating role of ethnic status held across social classes, with the exception of the upper class. 
This suggests that the two variables exert independent effects, and provides evidence against the 
idea that the effects of one are due to the other. Taken together, these results complement the 
findings from Studies 1 through 4 but importantly they extend them to a much broader 
population and provide convergent validity using a set of measures different from those in the 
preceding studies.  
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CHAPTER 7: The importance of the justice-relevance of different goal domains 
The first five studies have demonstrated that the belief that the world is just sustains 
people’s motivation to pursue long-term goals, but only among members of disadvantaged 
groups, specifically members of low socioeconomic status or ethnic minority groups. In all 
studies reported here, I deliberately chose to measure self-regulation in school- and career-
related domains. These types of goals – performing well at school, achieving a desired profession 
– are objectively dependent on justice: Grades can be readily attributed to causes which are 
either just (e.g., knowledge of course material) or unjust (e.g., a student’s ethnic background or 
physical appearance). Calibrating academic and career goals to societal justice beliefs is a 
rationally sensible thing to do, to the extent that societal justice can affect one’s own academic 
and career outcomes. 
I do not believe that academic and career-related goals are the only ones for which 
motivation can be calibrated to societal justice beliefs; as long as a goal is perceived to be 
justice-dependent – that is, so long as it makes sense to say that the goal was achieved either 
justly or unjustly, or that the failure to achieve it was either just or unjust – then the principles I 
have uncovered here should apply. However, there may be many goals that people do not 
perceive as justice-dependent, and for these goals, I have different predictions. 
Specifically, I hypothesize that disadvantaged group members’ motivation to pursue 
goals that they believe to be non-dependent on societal justice should relate to justice beliefs in 
the reverse direction. That is, I hypothesize that disadvantaged group members’ motivation to 
pursue these goals is heightened when they perceive societal injustice, and reduced when they 
perceive societal justice. This hypothesis draws on a sizeable literature on the dynamics of 
multiple goal-regulation: The processes that govern people’s allocation of their motivational 
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resources across the multiple goals they are pursuing at any given time. This research generally 
suggests that people have a limited set of resources that they distribute in a hydraulic fashion 
among their goals. As a result, when people turn resources away from one of their goals – 
whether because they feel they have made sufficient progress towards that goal (Schmidt & 
Deshon, 2007) or because they feel they are unlikely to succeed at that goal (Kernan & Lord, 
1990), they direct those resources towards a different goal. Conversely, when people focus their 
attention on one goal, they draw their resources away from other, competing goals (Shah, 
Friedman, & Kruglanski, 2002). 
Put differently, when members of disadvantaged groups draw their motivational 
resources away from their achievement goals in response to perceived injustice, they may not 
simply cease pursuing goals, but rather goals they believe to be non-justice-dependent may 
receive a motivational boost. Conversely, when members of disadvantaged groups perceive 
societal justice, and become more motivated to invest effort in pursuit of achievement goals, they 
may withdraw those resources from goals they believe to be non-justice-dependent. 
I tested this hypothesis in Study 6, by exposing participants to justice or injustice primes, 
and assessing their motivation towards not only academic goals, but also other goals that people 
perceive as relatively independent of societal justice. I measured participants’ motivation by 
asking them how much time they planned to spend on several activities on a hypothetical 
weekend, with some activities being related to their academic goals, related to their other 
similarly high-level goals, or not related to any important goals. I predicted that low SES 
participants primed with injustice, compared to those primed with justice, would plan to spend 
less time on activities related to their academic goals, but more time on activities related to non-




Participants. Ninety-six undergraduates (23 male, 73 female; mean age 20.4 years) 
participated in this study in exchange for course credit. 
Procedure. Participants signed up for an online study on “goals and verbal tendencies”. 
They first completed a demographics form, where they rated their SES on the same scale used in 
Studies 1 and 2. They then completed the “verbal tendencies” portion of the study, which 
constituted the manipulation of justice beliefs. We used a scrambled sentence paradigm, with the 
same justice condition described in Study 4. Instead of a neutral condition, though, I included an 
injustice condition (see Appendix D for the full list of sentences). Thus far I have focused on 
justice-enhancing manipulations, to avoid the possibility, supported by many justice theories 
(e.g., Jost, Banaji, & Nosek, 2004; Lerner, 1980), that people would respond defensively to 
justice-decreasing manipulations, and come away from those manipulations with increased, 
rather than decreased, justice beliefs. However, I thought that the scrambled sentence paradigm 
might be subtle enough to avoid evoking this reactive justice defense response. I wanted to 
include an injustice condition to rule out a potential alternative explanation for the results of 
Study 4. The sentences in the justice condition make references to money and success, therefore 
it could be that it was the salience of those constructs in the minds of participants which led them 
to report increased motivation. This alternative explanation does not account for the moderation 
by group membership; nonetheless, to be prudent, in Study 6 I used an injustice condition that 
also makes references to money and success. 
Following the scrambled sentence manipulation, participants completed the dependent 
measure, which assessed how much time on a hypothetical upcoming weekend they planned to 
spend on activities related to academic goals, activities related to non-justice-relevant goals, and 
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activities not related to long-term goals. To identify non-justice-relevant goals, I conducted a 
pilot test (see Appendix E for details), and found that people perceive academic and professional 
goals as more justice-relevant than health, social and spiritual goals. Because I suspected that 
spiritual goals would occupy a very small amount of most students’ weekend time, I chose to 
focus on health and social goals as my non-justice-relevant goals. 
I created a list of activities that were typical of students’ weekends, and related to either 
their academic goals (e.g., studying for tests), their social goals (e.g., catching up with friends via 
phone or email), their health goals (e.g., plan a healthy meal), or no long-term goal (including 
both chore-type activities [e.g., doing laundry] and pleasant but not clearly goal-relevant 
activities [e.g., watching TV]). See Appendix F for the full list of activities. I asked participants 
to indicate the number of minutes they planned to spend on each activity. Because participants 
varied considerably in how much total time they reported they would spend on the listed 
activities, I converted the raw numbers of minutes into a proportion, relative to the total amount 
of time each participant indicated for all 18 activities (see Appendix F for reliabilities). These 
proportion scores formed my dependent measures.
12
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 The use of proportion scores in this context is not ideal: Because I am using proportion scores, if low 
SES participants primed with injustice plan to spend less time on activities related to their academic goals, the 
reduction in the academic proportion score will necessarily entail an increase in at least one other proportion score. 
This would be a serious problem if I was predicting an increase in any or all of the other prediction scores; however 
my prediction is that this increase will happen specifically for the proportion scores that represent non-justice-
relevant goals. Moreover, the total amounts of time allocated by participants across all activities varied considerably, 
from about 300 minutes to about 3000 minutes, resulting in extremely large error terms. I chose to account for that 
variability by using proportion scores; however the same significant results emerged from a parallel set of analyses 




I predicted that low SES participants primed with injustice, compared to those primed 
with justice, would plan to spend less time on activities related to their academic goals, but more 
time on activities related to non-justice-relevant goals, and the same amount of time on non-goal-
related activities. I tested this prediction with a series of multiple regressions, using condition 
(justice = 1; injustice = 0), SES (centered) and their interaction to predict each of the proportion 
scores. Results are presented in Table 13. 
Table 13             
Unstandardized regression coefficients for all proportion scores (Study 6)      
Predictor Unstandardized SE Conf. Int. (95%) t
a
 p-value 
 Coefficient (B)       
Proportion: ACADEMIC activities 
SES 0.01 0.02 (-0.02, 0.05) 0.73 .47 
Condition -0.01 0.03 (-0.07, 0.05) 0.33 .75 
SES X condition -0.09 0.03 (-0.15, -0.04) 3.22 .002   
Proportion: SOCIAL activities 
SES -0.02 0.02 (-0.05, 0.02) 0.99 .33 
Condition -0.01 0.02 (-0.05, 0.04) 0.20 .84 
SES X condition 0.06 0.02 (0.02, 0.11) 2.61 .01   
Proportion: HEALTH activities 
SES 0.01 0.01 (-0.01, 0.02) 1.27 .21 
Condition -0.01 0.01 (-0.03, 0.02) 0.55 .58 
SES X condition 0.00 0.01 (-0.02, 0.02) 0.18 .86   
Proportion: PLEASANT activities 
SES 0.00 0.004 (-0.01, 0.01) 0.57 .57 
Condition 0.00 0.01 (-0.01, 0.02) 0.85 .40 
SES X condition 0.01 0.01 (-0.01, 0.02) 0.99 .33   
Proportion: CHORE-TYPE activities 
SES 0.00 0.002 (-0.01, -0.001) 2.48 .02 
Condition 0.00 0.002 (-0.004, 0.005) 0.20 .84 
SES X condition 0.00 0.002 (-0.002, 0.01) 1.26 .21   
a
 The degrees of freedom are 92. 
First, replicating my basic pattern of results, there was a significant SES X condition 
interaction predicting the proportion of time participants planned to spend on academic activities, 
β = -.42, t(92) = 3.22, p < .01 (see Figure 7
13
). I probed this interaction by comparing the simple 
slopes representing the effect of the justice versus the injustice prime among higher and lower 
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 The figure displays the proportions converted into minutes based on the average number of total minutes. 
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SES participants, where higher and lower SES were defined as being one standard deviation 
above and below the mean, respectively. Participants low in SES planned to spend more time on 
academic activities when primed with justice, compared to injustice, β = .28, t(92) = 2.03, p < 
.05; but participants high in SES showed the reverse pattern, β = -.34, t(92) = 2.48, p < .02. 
Figure 7. Number of minutes high and low SES participants planned to spend on academic and social activities as a 
function of priming condition (Study 6) 
 
 
When I examined activities related to non-justice-relevant goals, I found only one 
significant interaction, predicting the proportion of time participants planned to spend on social 
activities, β = .36, t(92) = 2.61, p = .01. I probed this interaction as above, and found that 
participants low in SES planned to spend more time on social activities when primed with 
injustice, compared to justice, β = -.28, t(92) = 1.98, p = .05; but participants high in SES showed 
the reverse pattern, with marginal significance, β = .24, t(92) = 1.68, p = .10. Neither SES, nor 
priming condition, nor their interaction predicted the amount of time participants planned to 
spend on health activities. When I examined non-goal-related activities (i.e., chores and pleasant 
activities), I found no significant interactions
14
. 
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 Because the reliabilities for these two proportion scores were so low, I conducted the same regression 




In Study 6, I replicated my main hypothesis using a different dependent measure: 
Injustice primes, compared to justice primes, led low SES participants to say they would spend 
less time on academic activities during an upcoming hypothetical weekend. I also found that the 
injustice primes made these same participants say they would spend more time on social 
activities, but no more time on other goal-related activities. In other words, when members of 
disadvantaged groups draw their motivational resources away from their academic and career-
oriented goals in response to perceived injustice, they do not simply cease pursuing goals, or 
distribute them randomly across all other potential pursuits, but rather they seem to reinvest 
specifically in social goals. This may suggest that there is something about social goals that 
makes them an ideal substitute for academic- and career-oriented goals; however Study 7 will 
have to replicate this effect before I speculate as to the reasons why. 
In Study 6, I found a fully significant replication of the unexpected marginal effect from 
Study 4: Participants with high SES responded to injustice primes by increasing their long-term 
academic goal motivation – or at least by reporting that they would spend more time on school-
related activities during an upcoming hypothetical weekend. This reverse pattern among 
members of advantaged groups is not something I had predicted, but it offers an intriguing 
opportunity for speculation. I return to this point in the General Discussion. 
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CHAPTER 8: Advantaged groups’ motivational responsiveness to self-relevant justice 
In six studies, I have found evidence supporting the notion that members of socially 
disadvantaged groups calibrate their long-term goal motivation, at least in academic and career-
related domains, to their beliefs about societal justice. Twice I found hints of a reverse pattern 
among members of advantaged groups, but in none of the studies did I find even a trace of a 
positive relationship between societal justice beliefs and motivation among people with high 
socioeconomic status, or among people who belong to the ethnic majority. In Study 7, I sought to 
examine members of advantaged groups in more depth; more specifically, to investigate the 
conditions under which they might calibrate their motivation to their justice beliefs similarly to 
members of disadvantaged groups. 
In the introduction, in a hypothesis supported by Study 4, I proposed that the group 
difference in the justice–motivation link occurs because members of disadvantaged groups 
perceive a tighter link between societal justice and their personal expectations of just treatment, 
compared to members of advantaged groups. However, I hypothesized that members of 
disadvantaged groups and members of advantaged groups should be equally likely to calibrate 
their motivation to societal justice information when that information is made personally relevant 
– that is, their motivation should respond to how justly and fairly they expect others will treat 
them personally. In my final study, I sought to test this prediction using an experimental 
paradigm. I reasoned that having participants read information about injustices that specifically 
targeted their ingroup would force even ethnic majority participants to draw personal 
implications from this information. For example, I suspected that reading about anti-white 
discrimination would affect white participants’ motivation to pursue long-term goals. 
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Thus, in Study 7, I attempted to manipulate white participants’ personal justice beliefs, by 
having them read a web post about injustices perpetrated specifically against white workers. I 
then measured participants’ academic motivation, as well as their motivation towards other, non-
justice-related goals as in Study 6. I predicted that white participants who had read about 
specifically anti-white injustices would show less motivation towards their long-term academic 
goals – that is, that they would plan to spend less time on school-related activities – but more 
motivation towards non-justice related goals, such as their social and health goals. Based on the 
findings from Study 6, however, I held my prediction about social goals with more confidence 
than my prediction about health goals. 
Method 
Participants. Ninety-nine undergraduates (26 male, 73 female; mean age 20.3 years) 
participated in this study in exchange for course credit. Participants were only invited to 
participate if they had self-identified as Caucasian during a Mass Testing session conducted at 
the beginning of the semester, but they had no knowledge of this selection criterion. 
Procedure. Participants volunteered to complete an online study purportedly about goals 
and knowledge. Participants first completed a demographics form. They then completed the 
“knowledge” portion of the survey. The website showed them a screenshot ostensibly taken from 
a human resources blog called iSight. Participants in the injustice condition saw a post entitled 
“Discriminatory hiring practices are increasingly common” (see Appendix G). This post 
explained to participants that more and more senior executives endorse the hiring of Asian 
candidates over white candidates, ultimately quoting an anonymous executive as saying, “If we 
have to choose between an Asian candidate and a similar White candidate, we’ll pick the Asian 
every time.” Participants in the control condition saw a post entitled “Use of internet reported to 
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be increasingly common” (see Appendix G). This post explained to participants that both 
employers and prospective employees are using the internet more and more during the job search 
and hiring processes. After reading the post and answering a few questions about it (e.g., “How 
often do you read internet blogs on these kinds of topics?” and “Do you think you may have 
heard or seen in other media coverage of the phenomenon described in the article?”), participants 
completed the dependent measure from Study 6. 
Results 
I predicted that white participants who had read about specifically anti-white injustices 
would plan to spend less time on school-related activities, but more time on social goals, and 
perhaps also more time on health goals, but the same amount of time on non-goal-related 
activities. I tested this prediction with a 2 (condition: neutral vs. anti-discrimination) X 5 (type of 
activity: academic vs. social vs. health vs. pleasant vs. chore) mixed-model ANOVA, with 
condition as the between-subjects factor and type of activity as the within-subjects factor. 
This analysis revealed the predicted interaction, F(4, 97) = 4.12, p = .003, η
2
p = .04. 
Given that the proportion scores of each participant added up to 0, the between-subjects error 
term in the analysis above was constrained to be near 0 which could distort standard simple 
effects tests, so I used t-tests to compare each proportion score as a function of condition (in the 
end, though, examining simple effects in the standard way revealed the same effects; see Table 
14 for means, standard deviations and t-tests). Participants who read about anti-Caucasian 
discrimination wanted to spend less of their time on school-related activities (M = .31, SD = .11) 
compared to participants who read a neutral article (M = .36, SD = .08), t(97) = 2.14, p < .04. 
These same participants who read the anti-discrimination article instead wanted to spend more of 
their time on social activities (M = .31, SD = .09), compared to participants who read the neutral 
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article, (M = .25, SD = .11), t(97) = 2.35, p < .02. None of the other comparisons approached 
significance, all ts < 1.19, all ps> .24
15
. 
Table 14             
Means and standard deviations for activity types per condition (Study 7)      
 ACADEMIC SOCIAL HEALTH PLEASANT CHORE  
 M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD  
Proportions 
 Neutral article .36 .11 .25 .09 .05 .04 .06 .01 .03 .01 
 Anti-Caucasian .31 .08 .31 .11 .04 .04 .06 .01 .02 .01 




 Neutral article 621  421  81  103  46 
 Anti-Caucasian 528  529  74  108  39
 discrimination article            
t-tests (df = 97)  
 Neutral vs.disc. 2.13*  2.35*  0.21  0.49  1.19   
a 
To obtain these figures, I converted the proportions back into minutes based on the average number of total minutes 
t 




The results of this experimental study confirm that members of high status groups do 
sometimes take justice considerations into account when determining their motivation to pursue 
long-term goals. Specifically, when participants from the socially dominant ethnic group read 
about a societal injustice towards their group that could affect their own personal outcomes, they 
responded by decreasing their motivation towards academic goals. However, replicating what I 
found in Study 6, they did not simply cease pursuing goals; rather, they specifically reinvested 
the time they withdrew from school-related activities into social activities. 
It is noteworthy that Study 7 replicated Study 6’s null effect for health goals. This adds 
strength to the possibility that social goals are a particularly strong candidate for replacing the 
school- and career-oriented goals that people disengage from when they perceive injustice that 
might affect them. Neither Study 6 nor Study 7 was designed with the aim of investigating why 
                                                 
15
 Because the reliability statistic for the “pleasant activity” proportion score was so low, I conducted a 
separate ANOVA on each pleasant activity individually. This analysis yielded no significant effects. 
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this might by, but I can speculate nonetheless. First one might wonder whether my findings arose 
from the fact that the social activities included in the measure (e.g., hanging out with friends, 
going to a party) may have been perceived as more fun than the health-related activities (e.g., 
going to the gym, planning a healthy meal). In other words, one might wonder whether 
participants presented with injustice may simply have opted to replace their academic activities 
with “fun”. This alternative explanation, however, does not hold up to scrutiny: the pleasant 
activities I included (e.g., watching TV, surfing the internet) are activities that are also perceived 
as fun, and yet they showed no trace of an effect in either study. 
Thus it does appear that there may be something special about connecting with people 
that stands out as an ideal candidate for replacing school and career-related goals. One possibility 
is that people’s social goals are simply more important than their health goals, which would 
explain why they would reinvest newly available resources fully in their social goals, and not at 
all in their health goals. Another, perhaps more interesting, possibility is that interpersonal 
relationships may offer the unique advantage of being able to replace many of the benefits 
people might hope to obtain from their academic and career goals. For example, extended social 
networks can provide some of the material resources that people gain by achieving their career 
goals (e.g., Wills, 1985). Likewise, just as achieving important academic and career goals can 
result in a boost to self-esteem, so can the feelings of belongingness that come with close 
relationships (Baumeister & Leary, 1995; Leary & Baumeister, 2000). Finally, close others can 
provide emotional support that may help people cope with the aversive feelings that may arise 
when one abandons one’s professional aspirations (e.g., Wills, 1985). Future research might 
examine why social goals may become particularly attractive in the face of societal injustice. 
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CHAPTER 9: General Discussion 
The present research tested the hypothesis that societal justice beliefs confer a special 
motivational benefit on members of socially disadvantaged groups. Across five studies, I 
consistently found evidence that beliefs in societal justice enhanced the motivation to pursue 
long-term goals, particularly academic and career-related goals, and that this effect was more 
consistent and stronger among members of socially disadvantaged groups. Members of 
advantaged groups showed somewhat inconsistent effects, ranging from no effect to a significant 
effect in the reverse direction. Although this latter observation was unexpected (I had anticipated 
a weakened, but still significant, effect for members of advantaged groups), and is discussed 
below, my predicted general pattern of data. The stronger association between societal justice 
beliefs and motivation to pursue long-term goals for members of disadvantaged, compared to 
advantaged, groups was highly consistent. It emerged regardless of whether justice beliefs were 
measured or manipulated (Studies 1, 2 and 5 vs. 4 and 6); whether group membership was 
operationalized in terms of socioeconomic status or ethnicity (Studies 1, 2, 5 and 6 vs. Studies 3, 
4, 5 and 7); and whether motivation was assessed in terms of persistence in the face of academic 
failure (Study 1), willingness to invest resources in and make sacrifices for long-term career 
goals (Studies 2 through 5), or desire to spend time pursuing academic goals (Studies 6 and 7). 
Thus, believing in societal justice appears to enhance the motivation to pursue long-term 
academic and career goals specifically among members of socially disadvantaged groups. 
Studies 6 and 7 suggested that some goals do not follow the same pattern as academic 
and career goals. Specifically, social goals appear to operate in the reverse direction: When 
members of disadvantaged groups are reminded of injustice, they reinvest in their social 
relationships. Study 7 also indicated that when societal justice information is made personally 
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relevant to members of high status groups, these individuals show the predicted response of 
calibrating their motivation to their justice beliefs. Thus, whereas justice beliefs may offer a 
benefit to members of both high and low status social groups when they are personally relevant; 
the motivational benefits offered by societal justice beliefs appear to be unique to disadvantaged 
groups, and provide one potential answer to the question I raised in the introduction about the 
functionality of believing in a just world for those who are disadvantaged. 
Accounting for two alternative explanations 
A cognition-based explanation. In my studies I have found that members of 
disadvantaged groups, when they believe society is not fair, show less motivation to pursue long-
term goals; specifically, academic and career-focused long-term goals. I have interpreted that to 
as evidence that societal justice beliefs enable goal motivation among members of these groups. 
However a social identity theorist might prefer a different, more cognitive explanation based on 
the salience of group identity. When people’s ingroup is threatened, the salience of their 
membership to that ingroup increases (Branscombe, Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 1999). For 
example, people who have suffered an injustice that placed their group in a relatively low-status 
position subsequently identified more strongly with their ingroup (Ellemers, Wilke, & Van 
Knippenberg, 1993). Thus, when disadvantaged participants in my studies were presented with 
societal injustice, their membership in a disadvantaged group could have become more salient. 
As a result, they may have shifted their attention from individualistic academic and professional 
goal pursuits towards more group-based goals, which could explain some of my findings. The 
possibility that injustice galvanizes collective goals is fascinating and I consider it in more detail 
below; however I do not think that this alternative explanation can entirely account for my 
results. Although this explanation could potentially explain the results I found using acute 
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reminders of societal injustice, it is less clear that it would predict the same effects for chronic 
beliefs in societal injustice. More critically, without a series of additional assumptions, this 
cognitive explanation has no way of accounting for the results I found using manipulations 
which enhanced justice beliefs. My hypothesis offers a more parsimonious explanation of the 
entire set of findings. 
A different motivated explanation. A different but related alternative implicates a more 
motivated process. Members of disadvantaged groups who achieve on an individual level within 
unjust systems may be worried about “selling out” their group (Fordham, 1988; Fordham & 
Ogbu, 1986). If an unjust system places my group at a disadvantage, I may fear that if I 
implicitly endorse the system by striving to achieve within its parameters, my fellow group 
members will resent me. Although this explanation could potentially account for some of my 
results, the bulk of the research that does support this alternative explanation comes from African 
American samples, whereas my disadvantaged group samples were low socioeconomic status 
groups in some studies and predominantly Asian Canadian ethnic minorities in other studies. 
There is no research showing that these group frame individual success as “selling out.” More 
importantly, many scholars have found that disadvantaged group members do not in fact fear 
repercussions from engaging with unjust systems (e.g., Cook & Ludwig, 1997; Spencer, Noll, 
Soltzfus, & Harpalani, 2001), casting serious doubt on the credibility of this alternative 
explanation. On the basis of this reasoning, then, I tentatively conclude that the evidence favors 
my hypothesis as the most plausible account of the set of results presented here. 
Implications for the Study of Justice 
The present studies elaborate on and expand one of the foundations of Just World theory 
(Lerner, 1980): That the motive to perceive one’s surroundings as fair and just may stem from 
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the need to pursue long-term goals. Implicit in this view of the origin of the justice motive is the 
idea that just environments are supportive of long-term goal pursuit, and that believing in justice 
serves to encourage people to engage their motivational systems and exert efforts directed 
towards the achievement of long-term gains. The studies described in the present article 
substantiate this idea, by showing that both chronic and experimentally induced beliefs about 
justice can promote increased motivation to pursue such important long-term goals as academic 
success and career achievement. 
In addition to providing novel empirical support for Lerner’s theorizing about the 
function of the justice motive, this research also contributes new insights to our understanding of 
the effects of group membership. My findings suggest that the motivational function of justice 
beliefs is qualified by individuals’ group membership, applying especially to members of 
socially disadvantaged groups. I found evidence that this group membership effect arises in part 
because it is usually only members of socially disadvantaged groups who translate their general 
justice beliefs into beliefs about their own personal just treatment. Societal injustice has different 
consequences for members of socially disadvantaged and advantaged groups. Discrimination and 
prejudice, and other forms of systemic societal injustice may prevent the disadvantaged from 
achieving their goals; thus, societal injustice may be more personally relevant for members of 
disadvantaged groups than for members of advantaged groups.  
Group differences in this justice – motivation link may also stem from differences in the 
higher-order or overarching motivations that underlie individuals’ motivations to pursue 
academic and career goals. Members of disadvantaged groups may see these goals as means 
serving the ultimate purpose of dramatically improving their place in society—of changing 
position from a low-status to a high-status group. Members of advantaged groups, in contrast, do 
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not need to improve their social standing, and may instead see academic and career goals as 
means to maintain (or slightly improve) their place in society. Achieving large improvements in 
one’s social position may be both more important and more difficult than simply maintaining or 
minimally improving it. Thus, relative to members of advantaged groups, members of 
disadvantaged groups may have more riding on long-term goals that are also more difficult to 
achieve. Because members of disadvantaged groups have larger stakes associated with their 
long-term goals, they might be especially interested in calibrating their motivation to factors that 
will impact their success, such as societal justice. 
Interestingly, some previous research had addressed Lerner’s original hypothesis about 
the functionality of just world beliefs from a different angle. Focusing on long-term goals, either 
as a result of a chronic orientation or a situationally-induced state, makes people more likely to 
derogate seemingly innocent victims, presumably in an effort to restore their belief in a just 
world (Hafer, 2000; Hafer, Bègue, et al., 2005). Whereas my findings suggest that societal 
justice is, for some people, a necessary prerequisite for long-term goal motivation, Hafer and 
colleagues’ findings suggest that people may at least on some level understand this idea, and care 
more about justice in their world when focused on their long-term goals. Combining our two sets 
of findings, I suspect that the phenomenon documented by Hafer and her colleagues might also 
apply most particularly to members of disadvantaged groups. Future research might examine 
whether individuals from disadvantaged socioeconomic backgrounds, or who belong to ethnic 
minority groups, are especially prone to enhanced victim derogation when focused on their long-
term goals. 
Although my results suggest that members of disadvantaged groups care more about 
justice when pursuing goals, they do not necessarily suggest that members of socially advantaged 
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groups are indifferent to justice. First, Study 7 demonstrated that members of high status groups 
do indeed calibrate their motivation to what they know about societal justice, as long as this 
societal justice information bears clear relevance to their own outcomes. Second, there are a 
multitude of other motivations unrelated to personal goal motivation that may cause members of 
socially advantaged groups to be concerned with justice (as discussed in the introduction, justice 
beliefs can enhance well-being and mental health, help people cope with feelings of uncertainty, 
and satisfy a broad range of needs including needs to feel like autonomous agents, to identify 
with and belong to social groups, and other existential, epistemic, and relational needs; Dzuka & 
Dalbert, 2002, 2007; Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003; Jost, Napier, Thorisdottir, 
Gosling, Palfai, & Ostafin, 2007; Kay, Gaucher, Napier, Callan, & Laurin, 2008; Lind & Tyler, 
1988; Lipkus et al., 1996; Montada et al., 1986; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999; Tyler, 1989; van den 
Bos, 2001; van den Bos & Lind, 2002; van Prooijen, 2009). 
That being said, some research has suggested that members of socially advantaged 
groups may not have the same need to believe in societal justice as members of socially 
disadvantaged groups (Jost, Pelham et al., 2003). Drawing on system justification theory, Jost 
and his colleagues (Jost & Hunyady, 2002; Jost, Pelham et al., 2003) have argued that members 
of low-status groups experience cognitive dissonance arising from the conflict between their 
belief that the system unjustly disadvantages them, and their belief that they themselves are, by 
their acquiescence, contributing to the stability of this system. According to this model, low-
status group members thus have a strong need to reduce this ideological dissonance through 
system justification, which explains the observation that at least some of the time, members of 
low status groups appear more motivated to maintain their belief in the justice of their system 
than members of high-status groups (Jost & Hunyady, 2002, Jost & Thompson, 2000). The 
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research I present here offers a complementary explanation for this phenomenon: Perhaps 
another reason why members of socially disadvantaged groups may be more motivated to 
maintain their societal justice beliefs is that for them, especially, these beliefs serve to enable 
long-term goal pursuit. 
Implications for the Study of Self-Regulation 
Research on the effectiveness of self-regulation has typically focused on individually-
based psychological processes and mechanisms that predict successful goal-pursuit over time. 
For instance, self-efficacy (Bandura, 1986), implicit theories (Blackwell, Trzesniewski, & 
Dweck, 2007; Dweck, Chiu, & Hong, 1995), self-regulatory strength (Muraven, Tice, & 
Baumeister, 1998), and individuals differences in the ability to delay gratification (Mischel, 
2008; Mischel, Shoda, & Rodriguez, 1989) and general self-control (Tangney, Baumeister, & 
Boone, 2004) have received major attention in the literature on successful self-regulation. It is 
clear that internal, intrapersonal, processes impact self-regulatory success. However, because 
goal pursuers are often immersed in social and interpersonal environments, and because their 
efforts are often impacted by other individuals and social structures, it is also important for self-
regulation researchers to learn about how external, interpersonal processes may impact self-
regulatory success. The present research contributes to growing efforts to understand social 
influences on self-regulation (Drigotas et al., 1999; Finkel et al., 2006; Fitzsimons & Finkel, 
2010) by examining how one particular feature of the social environment – the extent to which it 
is seen as operating justly – can influence people’s motivation to pursue long-term goals.  
Thus far, efforts to examine social effects on self-regulation have primarily focused on 
investigations of close interpersonal and commonly dyadic processes, such as the influence of 
instrumental friends and family members on people’s achievement (Fitzsimons & Shah, 2008) 
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and the influence of smooth dyadic interaction on subsequent self-control resources (Finkel et 
al., 2006). In contrast, the current research contributes a broader perspective, examining how 
general social structures may impact individual-level motivation toward personal goals via 
internalized beliefs about justice. In this fashion, the current work extends the important research 
on the performance effects of being a target of a stereotype, or being conscious of being a 
member of a stigmatized group (Pinel, 1999; Steele, 1997). Understanding the group dynamics 
and structural features that shape basic processes in self-regulation is an important area for future 
research.  
Implications for Personal Well-being, Social Equality and Politics 
Perhaps the most interesting implications of the present research are practical. Successful 
goal pursuit is one of the foundations of psychological health and well-being. My research 
suggests that the motivation of members of socially disadvantaged groups to achieve important 
goals is dependent on their beliefs about societal justice. It follows then, that for members of 
socially disadvantaged groups, psychological health and well-being are at least to some degree 
dependent on justice beliefs. Such individuals need to believe in societal justice to engage in the 
kinds of long-term goal efforts that are theorized to enhance well-being. While I am not the first 
to note the connection between justice beliefs and well-being (e.g., Dzuka & Dalbert, 2002, 
2007), the current perspective and my emphasis on group differences presents some important 
novel implications. 
First, the well-being of members of socially disadvantaged groups may be more 
constrained by conditions of societal justice than that of members of socially advantaged groups. 
Although societal injustice obviously limits the accomplishments of disadvantaged group 
members via discrimination and other unjust practices that objectively impact how they are 
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perceived and treated, my research suggests that even the mere perception of societal injustice 
may constrain the goals and self-regulatory resources needed to achieve well-being. Perhaps 
more importantly, from a societal perspective, perceived injustices may end up legitimizing the 
status quo and further hindering the prospects of members of disadvantaged groups. If members 
of disadvantaged groups are demotivated by injustice in society, and as a result work less hard 
and ultimately achieve less, then this may reinforce the notion that members of these groups 
deserve their inferior status, and make it even more difficult for them to achieve their goals.  
Second, the current research highlights the relevance of distinguishing between the 
consequences of actual justice and beliefs about justice, a point which is made evident in the 
disturbing possibility raised in the paragraph above. Actual, objective justice has obvious 
implications for well-being: Members of socially disadvantaged groups are the ones who suffer 
under conditions of injustice. But empirical attention to the impact of subjective justice on well-
being should not be neglected. Although the benefits of justice beliefs in the absence of actual 
justice are likely limited, the same is likely true of the reverse. It is obviously important to 
change the objective social landscape if one hopes to make strides towards social equality; 
however, my research suggests that doing so may not reap all the expected benefits if that change 
is not reflected in the perceived social landscape. Changing a company’s policies, for example, 
to more ardently ensure equal treatment of all employees regardless of class, race, or gender will 
be helpful; but the findings reported here suggest that doing so without also communicating these 
changes will necessarily limit its effectiveness.  
This does not imply, however, that people need to always be kept abreast of the state of 
social justice if one hopes to encourage more social equality. Although attempts to end injustice 
and discrimination often involve raising awareness of injustice, the present research suggests a 
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potentially ironic consequence of such strategies. According to the present research, this strategy 
may ultimately compound, rather than alleviate, inequality. That is, attempts to raise the public’s 
awareness of societal injustice may increase the discrepancy between the achievements – or at 
least the motivation to achieve – of members of advantaged and disadvantaged groups. Perhaps 
focusing on the relative differences in societal injustice (“we have come a long way, but more 
progress needs to be made”) would be an effective means of circumventing this potential 
unintended consequence of awareness campaigns.  
Integrating these implications with existing literature. The implications I have just 
sketched follow directly from my findings on the link between justice beliefs and goal pursuit, 
for members of disadvantaged groups. However, real-world implications must ultimately be 
drawn not from one set of findings, but from an integration of a whole body of literature. How 
does the balance sheet of the costs and benefits of perceiving justice come out when one 
considers all existing social psychological research? It is beyond the scope of this dissertation to 
make an exhaustive list; however at this juncture it is appropriate to describe at least a portion of 
the broader context within my research is situated, to illustrate the complexity of this question. 
First, my research is not the only perspective which suggests that perceiving justice is 
beneficial – and injustice deleterious – for members of disadvantaged groups. The findings 
described here suggest that perceiving injustice can reduce these individuals’ motivation 
particularly in academic and career domains. Stereotype threat research (Steele & Aronson, 
1995) suggests a different but complementary pathway via which perceiving the potential for 
prejudice reduces performance in these domains. According to this body of research, when 
members of negatively stereotyped groups encounter a scenario where they could potentially 
confirm the negative stereotype in the eyes of observers – for instance, when members of certain 
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ethnic minority groups enter into an academic testing situation – their performance drops. This 
drop occurs as a result of stress, performance monitoring and the suppression of negative affect, 
which distract negatively stereotyped individuals from the task at hand (Schmader, Johns, & 
Forbes, 2008). In other words, the stereotype threat phenomenon does not implicate reduced 
motivation as an immediate response to situational threat, which makes it distinct from my 
research – in fact, if anything the stereotype threat prediction should be that individuals 
experiencing stereotype threat are more, not less, motivated to perform well. That being said, the 
high levels of motivation I found among members of disadvantaged groups under high perceived 
societal justice show a nice parallel to the stereotype threat notion that members of many 
disadvantaged groups have strengths that remain hidden until they are confident that they will be 
treated fairly and non-prejudicially (see Walton & Spencer, 2009). 
Another body of research that speaks indirectly to the benefits of perceiving justice for 
members of disadvantaged groups was discussed briefly in the introduction. A number of 
researchers have identified a so-called personal/group discrimination discrepancy: A 
phenomenon whereby members of stigmatized groups, even when they acknowledge 
discrimination against their group, can be more reluctant to accept that discrimination happens to 
them as individuals (Crosby, 1982; Taylor et al., 1994). In the words of Claude Steele, this 
discrepancy arises because of the negative consequences of perceiving injustice: “One of the 
most devastating things is to think, ‘This is a racist situation and my prospects really will be 
affected by racism.’… It’s devastating to think, ‘I’m dealing in a world where the deck is stacked 
and there’s nothing I can do’” (Cose, 2011, p. 14). While the personal/group discrimination 
discrepancy does not directly speak to the processes I have identified here, the devastation 
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described by Claude Steele is precisely what I hypothesized leads to decreased motivation 
among members of disadvantaged groups with low societal justice beliefs. 
Other research, though, has illustrated the opposite side of the justice belief coin, and 
documented the negative effects of believing in justice – and the positive effects of believing in 
injustice – for members of disadvantaged groups. Abundant research has demonstrated the 
benefits for members of disadvantaged groups of being able to attribute failures to 
discrimination, thus protecting their feelings of self-worth (Crocker & Major, 2003; Crocker, 
Voekl, Testa, & Major, 1991; Major & Crocker, 1993). It follows, then, that because believing in 
societal justice precludes this protective mechanism, it might lead to feelings of frustration and 
low self-worth among members of disadvantaged groups (Jost & Thompson, 2000). This effect 
is likely strongest when objective societal justice is low and members of disadvantaged groups 
who nonetheless believe in societal justice experience frequent failures which they cannot 
otherwise explain. Even worse, these latter circumstances might be particularly likely to lead to 
John Henryism (James, 1994), a phenomenon whereby members of disadvantaged group 
members encounter repeated unjust failures which they fail to attribute to discrimination, and 
respond with the investment of even greater efforts. While these efforts might sometimes be 
rewarded with material success, they take their toll when it comes to health, leading to 
hypertension as well as other health-related problems. This phenomenon fits my findings 
regarding the motivational effects of justice beliefs, and illustrates further the dangers of 
exaggerated beliefs in societal justice. 
The final balance. Research, then, is mixed when it comes to the positive and negative 
effects of believing in societal justice. The contrasting effects are illustrated nicely in recent 
work on the effects of anticipating prejudice. When ethnic minority individuals encounter others 
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whom they expect to be prejudiced, their own experience of the interaction is more negative. 
However by the same token, because they become more concerned with behaving in ways that 
their interaction partner will approve of, their interaction partner ends up with more positive 
impressions of them (Shelton, Richeson, & Salvatore, 2005). In other words, ethnic minorities 
who anticipate the injustice of prejudice experience interpersonal gains at intrapersonal costs. 
In summary, I must conclude that there is no clear answer to the question “Is it better for 
members of disadvantaged groups to believe in societal justice or societal injustice?” Each belief 
comes with a distinct set of advantages and disadvantages, and which set is most beneficial 
depends on the person and situation in question. To tie this notion to the present thesis’ focus on 
self-regulation, one could imagine an integrative model whereby the question is analyzed 
separately for each phase of goal pursuit. Such a model might posit that while setting goals and 
pursuing them, believing in societal justice would give members of disadvantaged groups the 
most motivation and therefore the greatest chance of success. It might even grant them the 
greatest degree of approval from observers. In contrast, when looking back on one’s past 
attempts, believing in societal injustice might protect members of disadvantaged groups from 
feeling incompetent when setbacks are experienced and, where applicable, from feeling that they 
had confirmed a negative stereotype about their group. However even this two-step formulation 
is likely too simplistic, given what we know about observers’ interpretations of invested effort 
(Hong, Chi-yue, Dweck, Lin, & Wan, 1999) and about perceptions of those who claim to have 
been victims of discrimination (Kaiser & Miller, 2001, 2003). More elaborate integrative models 





Limitations and future directions 
The question of behavior. Although the studies described here provide reasonably 
persuasive evidence that the motivation of members of disadvantaged groups is sensitive to their 
beliefs about societal justice, they are silent on the question of the downstream consequences for 
behavior. I did try to go beyond simple self-report measures of motivation – in Studies 2 through 
4 I used a statistical technique to isolate a motivation component from a more complex response, 
and in Studies 6 and 7 I used a behavioral intention measure. Nonetheless, none of the seven 
studies examine how societal justice beliefs affect the behavior of members of disadvantaged 
groups. Although this may have been a necessary first step in order to differentiate my findings 
from the stereotype threat literature, the question remains as to whether members of 
disadvantaged groups actually try harder, and perhaps perform better, when they believe in 
societal justice. Future research could employ laboratory paradigms as well as longitudinal 
designs in real-world settings to further explore this question. Preliminary results from a lab 
study show that ethnic minority participants presented with a manipulation similar to the one 
used in Study 7 (but targeted at their group) showed less persistence on an anagrams task, and 
showed marginally worse performance (Laurin, 2012a); however this effect must be replicated to 
assess its reliable. Another interesting way of testing for behavioral effects of justice beliefs 
might be to design an intervention for college students based on the principles described here, 
and investigate whether this intervention can improve academic performance among members of 
targeted disadvantaged groups. 
Motivated by injustice? Throughout this paper, I have reasoned that it is functional for 
members of disadvantaged groups to calibrate their motivation on long-term goals to their beliefs 
about societal justice. However, there is also reason to believe that this calibration tendency may 
84 
 
also have negative consequences for members of disadvantaged groups, and, relatedly, that there 
may be times when the effect can be reversed. With regards to the negative consequences, it is 
true that in a completely unjust world where members of disadvantaged groups are routinely and 
without exception barred from breaking into certain careers, for instance, it makes little sense to 
work towards achieving these careers. In such a case, tying motivation to perceptions of societal 
injustice would save disadvantaged group members from working fruitlessly. However, it is also 
true that for the most part modern societal injustice is rarely so blatant as to completely exclude 
people based on their social group membership. In all but the most discriminatory societies, 
unambiguously outstanding candidates can often overcome biases against their social groups (see 
Dovidio & Gartner, 2000). In other words, even in an unjust job market, some members of 
disadvantaged groups might be able to attain many career goals. If instead they work less hard 
toward their career goals when they perceive a discriminatory tendency in the job market, 
though, then they will be less likely to achieve the goals that they might, albeit with great 
difficulty and against steep odds, have attained. Thus, my research suggests that believing in 
societal justice might benefit members of disadvantaged groups in the narrow, goal-specific 
sense, in that it allows them to direct their energy toward obtaining desired outcomes. Taking a 
step back and considering the larger social picture, however, makes it less clear whether the 
tendency of members of disadvantaged groups to calibrate their motivation to their justice beliefs 
is, on balance, functional or dysfunctional. 
With regards to the possibility of reversing the effect, when an obstacle lies in a person’s 
path, whether that obstacle is societal injustice or something completely unrelated, that person 
can respond in at least two different ways. These roughly correspond to the ideas of “fight” and 
“flight”. First, she can turn away from that path, stop pursuing the goal that lies at its end, and 
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perhaps choose to instead invest her efforts in pursuit of goals that seem more attainable. This 
“flight” response is analogous to what I detected in the studies reported here: Participants who 
perceived that societal injustice threatened their goal pursuits became less motivated to pursue 
those goals. Her second response option, though, is to attempt to surmount the obstacle, which 
would require a greater commitment to her original goal and a larger investment of effort. 
Although I found no sign of this in my studies, I suspect there may be conditions which pull for 
this “fight” response. For example, it may be that exposure to exemplars who have successfully 
overcome obstacles leads members of socially disadvantaged groups to be more, rather than less, 
motivated by unfairness (see Marx, Ko, & Friedman, 2009, for evidence of the positive effects of 
such exemplars). In a similar fashion, it may be that strong feelings of power or self-efficacy 
give people the confidence to believe they can overcome the obstacle of injustice. Alternatively, 
thinking about how the social world is dynamic, and how societal justice is subject to change 
over time, may inspire members of disadvantaged groups to try to overcome societal injustice in 
hopes of disproving prejudicial attitudes and eventually overturning systemic discrimination. 
Future research should investigate these as well as other possibilities. 
This notion of being inspired by injustice may also help account for the two occasions 
where I found marginally significant or fully significant reverse patterns among members of 
advantaged groups. It may be that these represent the inspirational effects of injustice. Both times 
I found those effects using a subtle scrambled sentence prime, rather than a more direct or 
obvious manipulation of societal justice beliefs. Moreover I found the effect most strongly when 
I used an injustice prime rather than a neutral prime, to contrast with the justice prime. Speaking 
speculatively, it could be that the injustice primes, although they did not change the beliefs of 
advantaged group members about personal just treatment, nonetheless activate the concept of 
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“obstacle” in their minds. It could also be that members of advantaged groups typically feel 
powerful and self-efficacious – perhaps thanks to their history of having had access to the 
resources to help them successfully overcome obstacles – and that this allows them to produce 
the “fight” reaction in response to the mere notion of injustice. I cannot substantiate these ideas 
with any definitive empirical evidence at this time, but perhaps future research can address them. 
Societal justice and collective goals. In all studies reported here, I deliberately chose to 
measure self-regulation in the context of individual goals. However collective goals – goals that 
are pursued with or for others – form an important category of goals about which the current 
research is silent. How do beliefs about societal justice influence collective goal motivation? 
This question must be answered empirically; however I can offer two speculations. On the one 
hand, they might operate similarly to individual goals, in which case the key factor might be the 
extent to which the goal is justice-relevant. Imagine a group of people who aim to improve 
sustainability within their workplace. If their plan is to approach this goal from within the 
existing structure of their workplace, then the likelihood of their success depends to a large 
extent on how justly and fairly that structure operates. If they plan to form committees, attend 
board meetings and propose motions, then they may be more likely to move forward if they trust 
that their ideas will be judged on their merits, and not on the gender, ethnicity or status of those 
who put them forward. Moreover, I would argue based on the same reasoning that underlies the 
hypotheses I have tested here that they are likely to be especially sensitive to these kinds of 
considerations if they are members of disadvantaged groups. But if this same group of people 
aims to approach the same sustainability goal from outside of the existing structure – if their plan 
involves more radical action than bureaucracy – the degree of justice present in their workplace 
becomes irrelevant, and is therefore unlikely to influence their motivation. 
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On the other hand, there are at least two reasons why it might be appropriate to consider 
collective goals as separate from individual goals, and why injustice might in fact act as a 
catalyst to them. First, given the results from Studies 6 and 7 which showed how injustice can 
orient people towards their social goals, because collective goals are pursued with or for others 
then they might fall into social goal categories. Second, many collective goals are aimed at 
improving society, or at least a portion of it. Injustice may signal that something is wrong with 
society, and therefore motivate people towards social improvement goals. This latter possibility 
flies in the face of much of system justification theory (Jost, Banaji, & Nosek, 2004); however 
that theory notwithstanding other researchers have begun to identify the conditions under which 
system improvement becomes a viable goal (Johnson & Fujita, 2012). All in all, how societal 
justice beliefs influence collective goal pursuit remains an unanswered question in need of future 
research. 
Women as a disadvantaged group. In the present studies, I have tried to stay true to my 
original hypothesis, which concerned the entire category of socially disadvantaged groups rather 
than any specific disadvantaged group. In my laboratory studies I used both socioeconomic 
status as well as ethnicity as markers of disadvantage, and in Study 5 I was able to use both 
markers in a single dataset. While my hypotheses are consistently supported using both of these 
indicators, I have repeatedly failed to find my predicted group differences using gender as a 
marker of disadvantage. Here I offer three speculative explanations for this fact. 
First, the absence of gender differences could represent a serious challenge to my 
theoretical position, and suggest that I have incorrectly identified the moderator of the strength of 
the effect of justice beliefs on motivation. Indeed, even though SES and ethnic status both 
moderate the effect, and both are markers of social disadvantage, it is possible that they also 
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share some other commonality – one which makes them distinct from gender – that explains 
their apparent similarity in this regard. While this explanation is logically sound, I find it 
implausible. Women share many of the similarities that exist between people with low SES and 
members of ethnic minorities – for instance, all three groups tend to be poorer, more religious, 
and more liberal (e.g., Cohen & Haberfeld, 2003; De Vaus, & McAllister, 1989; Light & Gold, 
2000; Lundberg & Startz, 1988; Miller & Stark, 2002; OECD, 2008; US Beureau of Labor 
Statistics, 2010) – and moreover I controlled for these latter two variables in Study 5, so I am 
skeptical that the effects I found are driven by something other than social disadvantage. 
Second, the absence of gender differences could be taken to mean that women are not – 
or at least, do not view themselves – as a disadvantaged group. It is true that broadly speaking, 
gender equality has improved over the last few decades. However, given the (ample) evidence 
that there are still important status differences between men and women (e.g., Haveman & 
Beresford, 2012; Skaggs, 2012), it seems unrealistic to think that women simply believe that they 
are no longer a disadvantaged group (e.g., see Kosslera et al., 2011). 
What seems more likely is a third explanation: That women’s view of their social status 
is context-sensitive, and that my studies have generally taken place in contexts where women are 
not particularly disadvantaged. In all studies except Study 5, female participants were primarily 
psychology undergraduates. In psychology courses, women typically outnumber the men, and 
the successful role-models (i.e., the professors and teaching assistants) are often female. Thus it 
seems plausible to assume that women do not view themselves as disadvantaged in the context of 
psychology courses. Because my female participants completed the studies for credit in 
psychology courses, at the time of study completion they may not have been feeling that being a 
woman made them particularly disadvantaged. Had I recruited my participants in a context that 
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This third explanation leads to a prediction I have tested by re-analyzing the WVS sample 
from Study 5. If women’s view of their social status is context-sensitive, one relevant context 
should be the overall level of gender equality in the environment, which I operationalized as each 
country’s degree of gender equality, as measured by the UN. I predicted that in countries where 
there is a large degree of gender inequality, women should perceive themselves as relatively 
disadvantaged, and in those countries I found that, consistent with my hypothesis, women 
calibrate their motivation to their justice beliefs to a greater extent than men. In countries that 
have achieved greater gender equality, though, women may not conceive of themselves as 
disadvantaged, and in these countries I found no gender difference in the justice–motivation link 
(Laurin, 2012b). 
These results notwithstanding, at this point I cannot make firm claims about the absence 
of gender effects in my studies. Although I view the third explanation as the most plausible, 
further empirical study is needed to produce more definitive conclusions. 
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 A similar logic might predict that my primarily Asian samples of ethnic minority students would not 
have shown the predicted calibration effect had I conducted the studies in the context of engineering or math 
courses, where at the University of Waterloo many faculty advisors and teach assistants are non-Caucasian, and 
where Asian students are stereotyped in a positive manner. In psychology courses, though, Asians represent a 
minority group both in terms of students and role models, and as a result my Asian participants may have been 
aware of their status as disadvantaged group members. It may also be the case that, for reasons unknown, women’s 
perceptions of their own disadvantage are more context-sensitive than the self-perceptions of ethnic minorities. 





Although considerable strides have been made over the past two decades in 
understanding when and for whom justice concerns are aroused, experimental research 
examining the functionality of justice beliefs remains notably absent (Hafer & Begue, 2005). In 
the absence of such research, our understanding of the psychological roots and antecedents of 
justice beliefs will remain incomplete. I believe the studies reported here represent a significant 
step towards addressing this gap in the literature, and, at the same time, connect the psychology 
of justice to both processes of self-regulation and group identities. 
My findings also carry significant political implications, however I believe these must be 
placed within the context of a broader body of knowledge. It may appear at first glance that my 
findings represent an endorsement of the idea that societal unfairness should not be discussed, 
and that those who heighten awareness of societal injustices may unintentionally exacerbate 
problems for disadvantaged groups. It is true that I have found that in some contexts, believing in 
societal justice offers a significant motivational benefit to members of disadvantaged groups. In 
the long term, however, keeping quiet about discrimination and believing in a fictitious form of 
societal justice will likely lead to worse, rather than better collective outcomes, such as repeated 
failure and frustration, poor psychological adjustment, and even poor physical health (Crocker & 
Major, 2003; Crocker, Voekl, Testa, & Major, 1991; Jost & Thompson, 2000; James, 1994; 
Major & Crocker, 1993). It is my hope that further research will shed light on how to handle 





Belief in Ultimate Justice scale items 
(R) 1. I believe that many good deeds go unrewarded in the end. 
(R) 2. I believe that many bad deeds go unpunished in the end. 
3. I believe that, in the long run, the bad things that happen to people are offset by good things. 
4. I believe that good people are rewarded in life, although not always immediately. 
5. I believe that bad people are punished in life, although not always immediately. 
6. I believe that, in the long run, people get what they deserve. 
7. I believe that people’s efforts are eventually noticed and rewarded in life. 
8. I believe that over the course of one’s life, justice is always served in the end. 
 




Measure of mother’s and father’s occupational prestige used to verify measure of subjective SES 
 
Please read through the categories of occupations below, and select the category corresponding 
to the occupation of each of your parents. You may not find your parents' specific occupations in 
any of the categories; simply choose for each of your parents the category you feel his or her 
occupation fits best. 
 
1 Day labourer, janitor, house cleaner, farm worker, food counter sales, food preparation 
worker, busboy 
2 Garbage collector, short-order cook, cab driver, shoe sales, assembly line workers, 
masons, baggage porter 
3 Painter, skilled construction trade, sales clerk, truck driver, cook, sales counter or general 
office clerk 
4 Automobile mechanic, typist, locksmith, farmer, carpenter, receptionist, construction 
laborer, hairdresser 
5 Machinist, musician, bookkeeper, secretary, insurance sales, cabinet maker, personnel 
specialist, welder 
6 Supervisor, librarian, aircraft mechanic, artist and artisan, electrician, administrator, 
military enlisted personnel, buyer 
7 Nurse, skilled technician, medical technician, counsellor, manager, police and fire 
personnel, financial manager, physical / occupational / speech therapist 
8 Mechanical / nuclear / electrical engineer, educational administrator, veterinarian, 
military officer, elementary / high school / special education teacher 
9 Physician, attorney, professor, chemical and aerospace engineer, judge, CEO, senior 






Text from justice and control conditions in Study 3 
 
Justice condition: 
Good news for Canada! 
 
Since very early on, there have always been people who were concerned with justice, fairness and 
the equal treatment of all human beings. Recent sociological advances have permitted researchers 
to establish a single unbiased index of fairness using objective indicators such as education levels, 
individual wealth and health outcomes within a given country. For instance, this index takes into 
account how well people’s financial outcomes and professional success are determined by their 
hard work and the education they complete, as opposed to being attributable to demographic 
variables and biased perceptions. 
 
This research has recently focused on Canada, and has found that in the past decade, Canada has 
become a much more fair place. In other words, it is becoming more and more likely that the hard 
work of Canadian citizens will translate into occupational success, and less likely that factors such 
as gender or family connections will have an influence. Furthermore, the inequalities between 
demographic groups in terms of physical health and emotional wellbeing are becoming smaller 
and smaller. 
 
Overall then, it seems that Canadian society is becoming more and more fair, and all indicators 
point to this trend continuing over the next several years. 
 
Control condition:  
Good news for the spotted tree frog! 
 
Since the very early days of objective science, ecologists have taken a special interest in the 
biodiversity of and extinction patterns. Recent biological advances have permitted researchers to 
establish a single unbiased index of survival rates of various species using objective indicators 
such as average lifecycle, the slope of population change and the yearly changes in the prevalence 
of both predators and food sources. For instance, this index takes into account how well increases 
in population size can compensate for increases in the number of predators, and how well the 
availability of food sources can support a growing population or an increasing long-lived one. 
 
This research has recently focused on the spotted tree frog, found in the Amazonian rainforests, 
and has found that in the past decade, its likelihood of extinction has dropped dramatically. While 
only 15 years ago, this animal figured prominently on the list of the world’s most endangered 
species, it appears that its low population has simultaneously led to a decrease in the prevalence of 
its predators and an increase in the abundance of food sources. Furthermore, its lifecycle is getting 
longer and longer, indicating that fewer spotted tree frogs are dying premature deaths. 
 
Overall then, it seems that the spotted tree frog is in less and less danger of extinction, and all 





Scrambled sentences used in Studies 4 and 6 
 
Justice sentences (Studies 4 & 6) 
 
well independent do people class 
goals grow is accomplishing 
satisfying 
hat always seatbelt wear your 
usually diligence alone rewarded is 
fair close usually is life 
people are merit judge on 
a computer time calculator saves 
living opportunity earn good a 
agreeable moves ambition you 
forward 
effort positive prosperity leads to 
healthy crowd very competition is 
people responsible carry get ahead 
fun exercise can hard be 
to try persistence success leads 
encourage children dream to people 
effective had working 
independently is 
lots water of conserve drink 
you makes self-reliance strong 
causes 
hands keep clean nose your 
deserve people rich house it 
Neutral sentences (Study 4 only) 
 
cakes she fluffy likes cats 
warm are coats winter shiny 
football game is a sport 
gift is life a sound 
movies sad entertaining are action 
fun gatherings coffee are social 
experience travel is an learning 
world around to sail the 
by college goes quickly time 
priceless friends are short good 
a computer time calculator saves 
sunsets can beautiful short be 
classes offer development 
intellectual promote 
books open worlds count new 
hat always seatbelt wear your 
fun exercise can hard be 
encourage children dream to people 
lots water of conserve drink 
hands keep clean nose your 
train romantic rides carriage are 
Injustice sentences (Study 6 only) 
 
groups face cat disadvantages some 
coat society be unequal can  
hat always seatbelt wear your 
hard work sound enough isn’t 
difficult is often achievement 
movies 
often unfair is coffee life 
hardships face many an people  
wise the are people elderly 
the advance to it’s hard  
can people biased be fork 
life others make cup difficult 
for are opportunities not equal 
rewards given should unfairly are 
people good get anyway punished 
beautiful paintings lead can be  
success  people few idea achieve 
fly bugs light end towards 
blocks opportunities personal often 
discrimination 
sometimes people bad very succeed 






Pilot test: Which goals do people associate with justice? 
 
With this pilot test I aimed to identify examples of goals which people do not associate 
with justice – or which they at least associate with justice to a lesser degree than they would 
academic or career goals. I selected health goals, social goals and spiritual goals as potential 
candidates, and sought to compare the extent to which people perceived these goals as justice-
relevant to the extent to which they perceive academic, professional and financial goals as 
justice-relevant. 
Participants. I recruited fifty-four American residents (33 women, 21 men and one 
person who did not report gender, Mage = 32.4 years) via Amazon Mechanical Turk 
(www.mturk.com) who participated online in exchange for a small sum. 
Procedure. Participants first encountered a list of goals listed in alphabetical order: 
Academic goals, financial goals, health goals, professional goals, social goals, and spiritual 
goals). They read that “The researchers are interested in what kinds of things people see as 
relevant to fairness. Which of the following goals do you see as most relevant to fairness or 
deservingness? That is, for which of these goals does it make the most sense to say that 
someone's success or failure was "fair" or "unfair"? Please select up to three (3) goals you see as 
most relevant to fairness.” 
On the next page, they then rated a series of specific outcomes according to how relevant 
they could be to justice. Specifically, they rated statements that took the form “How much sense 
would it make to say that it was ‘fair’ or ‘unfair’ that someone…” on a scale from 1 (no sense) to 




Table A1             
Items used to measure justice-relevance          
Item  Order Goal type  
How much sense would it make to say that it was “fair” or “unfair” that someone… 
 ... succeeded in getting an A in a course 9 Academic 
 ... failed a test 11 Academic 
 ... got in trouble at work 4 Professional 
 ... succeeded in getting a promotion at work 6 Professional 
 ... succeeded in saving enough to retire 7 Financial 
 ... failed to save enough money for a car 8 Financial 
 ... failed to improve their cardiovascular fitness 2 Health 
 ... succeeded in losing 10 pounds 12 Health 
 ... made a new friend 1 Social 
 ... failed to support a friend in need 5 Social 
 ... failed at communing with God 3 Spiritual 
 ... successfully joined a new church 10 Spiritual  
 
Results 
When selecting the goals they saw as most relevant to fairness, a chi square revealed 
significant differences in the number of participants selecting each goal, χ
2
(5, N = 139) = 30.1, p 
< .001. Thirty-eight participants selected academic goals, 33 selected professional goals, and 28 
selected financial goals. Only 10 participants selected each of social and spiritual goals, and 20 
selected health goals. Thus, academic and professional goals, along with financial goals, appear 
to be seen as more justice-relevant than health, social and spiritual goals. 
When rating the justice-relevance of various goal outcomes, a within-subjects ANOVA 
(with goal type as the within-subjects factor) revealed significant differences in the perceived 
justice-relevance of the goals, F(5, 54) = 29.43, p <.001. Table A2 presents the means and 
standard deviations, as well as the simple comparisons between each goal. 
Table A2             
Means and standard deviations, and significance tests comparing justice-relevance ratings for each goal type  
 M SD Fs (degrees of freedom: [5, 54]) 
Goal type   1 2 3 4 5  
Academic 5.03 1.45 - - - - - 
Professional 5.27 1.53 0.83 - - - - 
Financial 4.04 1.72 13.58** 21.12** - - - 
Health 3.79 1.71 21.12** 30.34** 0.83** - - 
Social 3.38 1.58 37.42** 49.41** 5.92** 2.31
t
 - 
Spiritual 2.51 1.59 87.63** 105.55** 32.23** 11.63** 10.53**  




List of activities given in Studies 6 and 7 
 
 
Order Type Activity Study 6 α Study 7 α  
 Academic  .50 .39 
2  studying for tests 
4  doing readings for class 
16  working on assignments     
 Social  .47 .50 
8  hanging out with friends 
12  going to a party 
17  catching up with friends via phone or email     
 Health  .51 .56 
10  planning a healthy meal 
13  working out at the gym 
15  going to a group fitness class     
 Pleasant  .09 .13 
3  watching TV 
5  eating 
9  surfing the net 
11  shopping 
14  napping     
 Chores  .22 .69 
1  doing dishes 
6  showering / shaving / grooming 
7  doing laundry 














Adams, J.S. (1965). Inequity in social exchange. In L. Berkowitz (Ed.), Advances in 
experimental social psychology (Vol. 2, pp. 267-299). NY: Academic Press. 
Aiken, L. S., & West, S. G. Multiple regression: Testing and interpreting interactions. Newbury 
Park, CA: Sage Publications. 
Anderson, J. E., Kay, A. C., & Fitzsimons, G. M. (in press). In search of the silver lining: The 
justice motive fosters perceptions of benefits in the later lives of tragedy victims. 
Psychological Science. 
Armitage, C. J., & Conner, M. (2001). Efficacy of the theory of planned behaviour: A meta-
analytic review. British Journal of Social Psychology, 40, 471-499. 
Atkinson, J. W. (1957). Motivational determinants of risk-taking behavior. Psychological 
Review, 64, 359-372. 
Bandura, A. (1986). Social foundations of thought and action: A social cognitive theory. NJ: 
Prentice Hall. 
Bandura, A. (1997). Self-efficacy: The exercise of control. NY: Freeman Press. 
Bargh, J. A., Gollwitzer, P. M., Lee-Chai, A., Barndollar, K, & Trotschel, R. (2001). The 
automated will: Non-conscious activation and pursuit of behavioral goals. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 81, 1014-1027. 
Barratt, W. R. (2006). The Barratt Simplified Measure of Social Status (BSMSS): Measuring 
SES. Retrieved February 26, 2012, from 
http://wbarratt.indstate.edu/socialclass/Barratt_Simplifed_Measure_of_Social_Status.pdf 
Baumeister, R.F. (1998). The self. In D.T. Gilbert, S.T. Fiske, & G. Lindzey (Eds.), Handbook of 
social psychology (4th ed.; pp. 680-740). New York: McGraw-Hill. 
101 
 
Baumeister, R.F., & Leary, M.R. (1995). The need to belong: Desire for interpersonal 
attachments as a fundamental human motivation. Psychological Bulletin, 117, 497-529.  
Baumeister, R. F., Schmeichel, B. J., & Vohs, K. D. (2007). Self-regulation and the executive 
function: The self as controlling agent. In A. W. Kruglanski & E. T. Higgins (Eds.), 
Social psychology: Handbook of basic principles (2nd ed., pp. 516-539). NY: Guilford 
Press. 
Baumeister, R. F., & Vohs, K. D. (2007). Self-regulation, ego-depletion, and motivation. Social 
and Personality Psychology Compass, 1, 115-128. 
Baumeister, R. F., Vohs, K. D., & Tice, D. M. (2007). The strength model of self-control. 
Current Directions in Psychological Science, 16, 351-355. 
Betancourt, H., & Lopez, S. R. (1993). The study of culture, ethnicity, and race in American 
psychology. American Psychologist, 48, 629-637. 
Biernat, M., & Manis, M. (1994). Shifting standards and stereotype-based judgments. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 66, 5-20. 
Biernat, M., Manis, M., & Nelson, T. E. (1991). Stereotypes and standards of judgment. Journal 
of Personality and Social Psychology, 60, 485-499. 
Blackwell, L. S., Trzesniewski, K. H., & Dweck, C. S. (2007). Implicit theories of intelligence 
predict achievement scores across an adolescent transition: A longitudinal study and an 
intervention. Child Development, 78, 246-263. 
Branscombe, N. R., Ellemers, N., Spears, R., & Doosje, B. (1999). The context and content of 
social identity threat. In N. Ellemers, R. Spears, & B. Doosje (Eds.). Social identity: 
Context, commitment, content. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 
102 
 
Callahan-Levy, C. M., & Messe, L. A. (1979). Sex-differences in the allocation of pay. Journal 
of Personality and Social Psychology, 37, 433-446. 
Carver, C. S., & Scheier, M. F. (1990). Principles of self-regulation: Action and emotion. In E. 
T. Higgins & R. M. Sorrentino (Eds.), Handbook of motivation and cognition: 
Foundations of social behavior (Vol. 2, pp. 3-52). New York: Guilford Press. 
Cohen, Y., & Haberfeld, Y. (2003). Gender, ethnic, and national earnings gaps in Israel: The role 
of rising inequality.” Discussion paper No. 5, Pinhas Sapir Center for Development, Tel 
Aviv, August, http://econ.tau.ac.il/papers/sapir-wp/5-03.pdf. 
Cook, P. J., & Ludwig, J. (1997). Weighing the “Burden of ‘Acting White’”: Are there race 
differences in attitudes toward education? Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 
16, 256-278. 
Cose, E. (2011). The end of anger: A new generation’s take on race and rage. New York, Harper 
Collins. 
Crocker, J., & Major, B. (2003). The self-protective properties of stigma: Evolution of a modern 
classic. Psychological Inquiry, 14, 232-237 
Crocker, J., Voekl, K., Testa, M., & Major, B. (1991). Social stigma: The affective consequences 
of attributional ambiguity. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 60, 218-228. 
Crosby, F. J. (1982). Relative deprivation and working women. NY: Oxford University Press. 
Dalbert, C. (2002). Beliefs in a just world as a buffer against anger. Social Justice Research, 15, 
123-145. 
De Vaus, D., & McAllister, I. (1989). The changing role of women: Gender and political 
alignment in 11 nations. European Journal of Political Research, 17, 241-262. 
103 
 
Ditto, P. H., & Lopez, D. F. (1992). Motivated skepticism: Use of differential decision criteria 
for preferred and nonpreferred conclusions. Journal of Personality and Social 
Pscyhology, 63, 568-584. 
Dovidio, J. F., & Gaertner, S. L. (2000). Aversive racism and selection decisions: 1989 and 
1999. Psychological Science, 11, 315-319. 
Drigotas, S. M., Rusbult, C. E., Wieselquist, J., & Whitton, S. W. (1999). Close farmer as 
sculptor of the ideal self: Behavioral affirmation and the Michelangelo phenomenon. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 77, 293-323. 
Dweck, C.S., Chiu, C., & Hong, Y. (1995).   Implicit theories and their role in judgments and 
reactions:   A world from two perspectives.   Psychological Inquiry, 6, 267-285. 
Dzuka, J., & Dalbert, C. (2002). Mental health and personality of Slovak unemployed 
adolescents: The impact of belief in a just world. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 
32, 732-757 
Dzuka, J. & Dalbert, C. (2007). Aggression at School: Belief in a Personal Just World and Well-
Being of Victims and Aggressors. Studia Psychologica, 49, 313-320. 
Eccles, J. S., Adler, T. F., Futterman, R., Goff, S. B., Kaczala, C. M., Meece, J. L., & Midgely, 
C. (1983). Expectancies, values, and academic behaviors. In J. T. Spence (Ed.), 
Achievement and achievement motivation. CA: Freeman Press. 
Ehrenreich, B. (1989). The fear of falling: The inner life of the middle class. NY: Harper-Collins. 
Emmons, R. A. (1989). The personal striving approach to personality. In L. A. Pervin (Ed.), 
Goal concepts in personality and social psychology (pp. 87-126). NJ : Erlbaum. 
104 
 
Ellemers, N., Wilke, H., & Van Knippenberg, A. (1993). Effects of the legitimacy of low group 
or individual status on individual and collective identity enhancement strategies. Journal 
of Personality and Social Psychology, 64, 766-778. 
Feather, N. T. (1982). Expectancy-value approaches: Present status and future directions. In N. 
T. Feather (Ed.), Expectations and actions: Expectancy-value models in psychology (pp. 
395-420). NJ: Erlbaum. 
Finkel, E. J., Campbell, W. K., Brunell, A. B., Dalton, A. N., & Scarbeck, S. J., & Chartrand, T. 
L. (2006). High-maintenance interaction: Inefficient social coordination impairs self-
regulation. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 91, 456-475. 
Finkel, E. J., & Fitzsimons, G. M. (in press.) Effects of self-regulation on interpersonal 
relationships. In  K. D. Vohs & R. F. Baumeister (Eds.), Handbook of self-regulation, 
2nd Edition. 
Fishbach, A., Friedman, R. S., & Kruglanski, A. W. (2003). Leading us not unto temptation: 
Momentary allurements elicit overriding goal activation. Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 84, 296-309. 
Fitzsimons, G. M., & Finkel, E. J. (in press.) Interpersonal influences on self-regulation. Current 
Directions in Psychological Science. 
Fitzsimons, G. M., & Shah, J. (2008). How goal instrumentality shapes relationship evaluations. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 95, 319-337. 
Forham, S.(1988). Racelessness as a factor in Black students school success: Pragmatic strategy 
of pyrrhic victory. Harvard Educational Review, 58, 54-84. 
Fordham, S., & Ogbu, J. U. (1986). Black students’ school success: Coping with the “burden of 
acting White.” Urban Review, 18, 176–206. 
105 
 
Förster, J., Liberman, N., & Higgins, E. T. (2005). Accessibility from active and fulfilled goals. 
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 41, 220-239. 
Glick, P., & Fiske, S. T. (2001). An ambivalent alliance: Hostile and benevolent sexism as 
complementary justifications for gender inequality. American Psychologist, 56, 109-118. 
Godin, G., & Kok, G. (1996). The theory of planned behavior: A review of its applications to 
health-related behaviors. American Journal of Health Promotion, 11, 87-98. 
Guinote, A. (2007). Power and goal pursuit. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 33, 
1076-1087. 
Hafer, C. L. (2000). Investment in long-term goals and commitment to just means drive the need 
to believe in a just world. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 26, 1059-1073. 
Hafer, C. L., & Bègue, L. (2005). Experimental research on just-world theory: Problems, 
developments, and future challenges. Psychological Bulletin, 131, 128-167. 
Hafer, C. L., Bègue, L., Choma, B. L., & Dempsey, J. L. (2005). Belief in a just world and 
commitment to long-term deserved outcomes. Social Justice Research, 18, 429-444. 
Haveman, H. A., & Beresford, L. S. (2012). If you’re so smart, why aren’t you the boss? 
Explaining the persistent vertical gender gap in management. Annals of the American 
Academy of Political and Social Science, 639, 114-130. 
Heckhausen, J. (1991). Motivation and Action. Berlin: Springer. 
Heckhausen, J., & Schulz, R. (1995). A life-span theory of control. Psychological Review, 102, 
284-304. 
Hong, Y., Chiu, C., Dweck, C. S., Lin, D. M., & Wan, W. (1999). Implicit theories, attributions, 




Hong, Y. Y., Morris, M. W., Chiu, C. Y., & Benet-Martinez, V. (2000). Multicultural minds: A 
dynamic constructivist approach to culture and cognition. American Psychologist, 55, 
709-720. 
Haritatos, J., Mahalingam, R., & James, S. A. (2007). John Henryism, self-reported physical 
health indicators, and the mediating role of perceived stress among high socio-economic 
status Asian immigrants. Social Science & Medicine, 64, 1192-1203. 
Inglehart, R., Basañez, M., Diez-Medrano, J., Halman, L. and Luijkx, R. (2004). Human beliefs 
and values: A cross-cultural sourcebook based on the 1999-2002 value surveys. Mexico: 
Siglo XXI Editores. 
James, S. A. (1994). John Henryism and the health of African Americans. Culture, Medicine, 
and Psychiatry 18, 163-182. 
James, S. A., Hartnett, A. S., & Kalsbeek, W. D. (1983). John Henryism and blood pressure 
differences among black men. Journal of Behavioral Medicine, 6, 1573-3521. 
James, S. A., Strogatz,D. S., Wing, S. B., & Ramsey, D. L. (1987). Socioeconomic status, John 
Henryism, and hypertension in blacks and whites. American Journal of Epidemiology, 
126, 664-673. 
Johnson, I. R., & Fujita, K. (2012). Change we can believe in: Using perceptions of 
changeability to promote system-change motives over system-justification motives in 
information search. Psychological Science, 23, 133-140. 
Jost, J. T. (1997). An experimental replication of the depressed-entitlement effect among women. 
Psychology of Women Quarterly, 21, 387-393. 
Jost, J. T., & Banaji, M. R. (1994). The role of stereotyping in system-justification and the 
production of false consciousness. British Journal of Social Psychology, 33, 1-27. 
107 
 
Jost, J. T., Banaji, M. R., & Nosek, B. A. (2004). A decade of system justification research: 
Accumulated evidence of conscious and unconscious bolstering of the status quo. 
Political Psychology, 25, 881-919. 
Jost, J. T., & Burgess, D. (2000). Attitudinal ambivalence and the conflict between group and 
system justification motives in low status groups. Personality and Social Psychology 
Bulletin, 26, 293-305.  
Jost, J. T., Glaser, J., Kruglanski, A. W., & Sulloway, F. (2003). Political conservatism as 
motivated social cognition. Psychological Bulletin, 129, 339-375. 
Jost, J. T., & Hunyady, O. (2002). The psychology of system justification and the palliative 
function of ideology. European Review of Social Psychology, 13, 111-153. 
Jost, J. T. & Kay, A. C. (2010). Social Justice: History, Theory, and Research. To appear in the 
upcoming volume of the Handbook of Social Psychology, (Eds. S. Fiske & D. Gilbert). 
Jost, J. T., Napier, J. L., Thorisdottir, H., Gosling, S. D., Palfai, T. P., & Ostafin, B. (2007). Are 
needs to manage uncertainty and threat associated with political conservatism or 
ideological extremity? Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 33, 989-1007. 
Jost, J. T., Pelham, B. W., Sheldon, O., & Sullivan, B. N. (2003). Social inequality and the 
reduction of ideological dissonance on behalf of the system: Evidence of enhanced 
system justification among the disadvantaged. European Journal of Social Psychology, 
33, 13-36. 
Jost, J. T., & Thompson, E. P. (2000). Group-based dominance and opposition to equality as 
independent predictors of self-esteem, ethnocentrism, and social policy attitudes among 
African Americans and European Americans. Journal of Experimental Social 
Psychology, 36, 209-232. 
108 
 
Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1979). Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under risk. 
Econometrica, 47, 26-291. 
Kaiser, C. R., & Miller, C. T. (2001). Stop complaining! The social costs of making attributions 
to discrimination. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 27, 254-263. 
Kaiser, C. R., & Miller, C. T. (2003). Derogating the victim: The interpersonal consequences of 
blaming events on discrimination. Group Processes and Intergroup Relations, 6, 227-
237. 
Kay, A. C., Gaucher, D., Napier, J. L., Callan, M. J., & Laurin, K. (2008). God and the 
government: Testing a compensatory control mechanism for the support of external 
systems. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 95, 18-35. 
Kay, A. C., & Jost, J. T. (2003). Complementary justice: Effects of ‘poor but happy’ and ‘poor 
but honest’ stereotype exemplars on system justification and implicit activation of the 
justice motive. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 85, 823-837. 
Kernan, M. C., & Lord, R. G. (2000).Effects of valence, expectancies and goal-performance 
discrepancies in single and multiple goal environments. Journal of Applied Psychology, 
75, 194-203. 
Kluegel, J. R., & Eliot, R. S. 1986. Beliefs about inequality: American's views of what is and 
what ought to be. NY: Aldine de Gruyter. 
Kossler, K., Kuroki, L. M., Allsworth, J. E., Secura, G. M., Roehl, K. A., & Peipert, J. F. (2011). 
Perceived racial, socioeconomic and gender discrimination and its impact on 
contraceptive choice. Contraception, 84, 273-279. 
Kraus, M. W., Piff, P. K., & Keltner, D. (2009). Social class, sense of control, and social 
explanation, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 97, 992-1004. 
109 
 
Lane, R. (1962). The fear of equality. In R. E. Lane (ED.), Political ideology: Why the American 
common man believes what he does (pp. 57-81). NY: Free Press. 
Laurin, K. (2012a). Exposure to societal injustice reduces persistence of ethnic minorities. 
Manuscript in preparation. 
Laurin, K. (2012b). Justice beliefs and the motivation of women versus men: The moderating 
role of national gender equality. Manuscript in preparation. 
Leary, M.R., & Baumeister, R.F. (2000). The nature and function of self-esteem: Sociometer 
theory. In M. Zanna (Ed.), Advances in experimental social psychology (Vol. 32, pp. 1-
62). San Diego, CA: Academic Press. 
Lerner, M. J. (1965). Evaluation of performance as a function of performer’s reward and 
attractiveness. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1, 355-360. 
Lerner, M. J. (1977). The justice motive: Some hypotheses as to its origins and forms. Journal of 
Personality, 45, 1–52. 
Lerner, M. J. (1980). The belief in a just world: A fundamental delusion. NY: Plenum Press. 
Lerner, M. J., & Miller, D. T. (1978). Just world research and attribution process: Looking back 
and ahead. Psyhological Bulletin, 85, 1030-1051. 
Lerner, M. J., Miller, D. T., & Holmes, J. G. (1976). Deserving and the emergence of forms of 
justice. In L. Berkowitz & E. Walster (Eds.), Advances in experimental social psychology 
(Vol. 9, pp. 133–162). New York: Academic Press. 
Lerner, M. J., & Simmons, C. H. (1966). Observers reaction to innocent victim: Compassion or 
rejection. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 4, 203-210. 
110 
 
Lewin, K. (1926). Examinations on the psychology of action and affect. I: Preliminary remarks 
on psycho logical powers and energies and on the structure of the psyche. Psychologische 
Forschung, 7, 294-329. 
Li, X., & Petrick, J. F. (2008). Examining the antecedents of brand loyalty from an investment 
model perspective. Journal of Travel Research, 47, 25-34. 
Liberman, N., & Förster, J. (2000). Expression after suppression: A motivational explanation of 
postsuppressional rebound. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 79, 190-203. 
Light, I. and Gold, S. (2000).  Ethnic economies. San Diego, CA: Academic Press. 
Lind, E. A., & Tyler, T. R. (1988). The social psychology of justice. NY: Plenum Press. 
Lipkus, I. M. (1991). The construction and preliminary validation of a global belief in a just 
world scale and the exploratory analysis of the multidimensional belief in a just world 
scale. Personality and Individual Differences, 12, 1171-1178. 
Lipkus, I. M., Dalbert, C., & Siegler, I.C. (1996). The importance of distinguishing the belief in a 
just world for self versus for others: Implications for psychological well-being. 
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 22, 666-677. 
Lundberg, S., & Startz, R. (1998). On the persistence of racial inequality. Journal of Labor 
Economics, 16, 292-323. 
Maes, J. (1998). Immanent justice and ultimate justice: Two ways of believing in justice. In L. 
Mondata & M. J. Lerner (Eds.), Responses to victimizations and belief in a just world, 
(pp. 9-40). NY: Plenum Press. 
Maes, J. & Kals, E. (2002). Justice Beliefs in School: Distinguishing Ultimate and Immanent 
Justice. Social Justice Research 15, 227-244. 
111 
 
Maes, J., & Schmitt, M. (1999). More on ultimate and immanent justice: Results from the 
research project “Justice as a problem within reunified Germany”. Social Justice 
Research, 12, 65-78. 
Major, B. (1994). From social inequality to personal entitlement:  The role of social 
comparisons, legitimacy appraisals, and group membership.  In M. Zanna (Ed.) Advances 
in experimental social psychology, (Vol. 26, pp. 293-355). NY: Academic Press. 
Major, B., & Crocker, J. (1993). Social stigma: The affective consequences of attributional 
ambiguity. In D. M. Mackie & D. L. Hamilton (Eds.), Affect, cognition, and stereotyping: 
Interactive processes in intergroup perception (pp. 345-370). NY: Academic Press. 
Major, B., Gramzow, R., McCoy, S., Levin, S., Schmader, T., Sidanius, J. (2002). Attributions to 
discrimination: The role of group status and legitimizing ideology.  Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology. 82, 269-282. 
Major, B., Kaiser, C. R., O’Brien, L. T., & McCoy, S. K. (2007). Perceived discrimination as 
worldview threat or worldview confirmation: Implications for self-esteem. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 92, 1068-1086. 
Major, B., McFarlin, D. B., & Gagnon, D. (1986). Overworked and underpaid: On the nature of 
gender differences in personal entitlement. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 
47, 1399-1412. 
Marsh, R. L., Hicks, J. L., & Bink, M. L. (1998). Activation of completed, uncompleted, and 
partially completed intentions. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory 
and Cognition, 24, 350-361. 
Marsh, R. L., Hicks, J. L., & Bryan, E. S. (1999). The activation of unrelated and cancelled 
intentions. Memory & Cognition, 27, 320-32-7. 
112 
 
Marx, D. M., Ko, S. J., & Friedman, R. A. (2009). The “Obama effect”: How a salient role 
model reduces race-based performance differences. Journal of Experimental Social 
Psychology, 45, 953-956. 
McCoy, S. K., & Major, B. (2007). Priming meritocracy and the psychological justification of 
inequality. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 43, 341-351. 
Miller, A. S., & Stark, R. (2002). Gender and religiousness: Can socialization explanations be 
saved? American Journal of Sociology, 107, 1399-1423. 
Mischel, W. (2008). Delay of gratification: Underlying mechanisms and implications for the life 
course. International Journal of Psychology, 43, 12-12. 
Mischel, W., Shoda, Yuichi, & Rodriguez, M. L. (1989). Delay of gratification in children. 
Science, 244, 933-938. 
Montada, L., Schmitt, M., & Dalbert, C. (1986). Thinking about justice and dealing with one’s 
own privileges: A study on existential guilt. In H. W. Bierhoff, R. Cohen, & J. Greenberg 
(Eds.), Justice in social relations (pp. 125-143). NY: Plenum Press. 
Muraven, M., Tice, D. M., & Baumeister, R. F. (1998). Self-control as limited resource: 
Regulatory depletion patterns. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 74, 774-
789. 
National Anti-Racism Council of Canada (NARCC). (2007). Racial discrimination in Canada. 
Retrieved March 3, 2012, from 
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cerd/docs/ngos/narcc-new.pdf 
Napier, J.L., & Jost, J.T. (2008). Why are conservatives happier than liberals? Psychological 
Science, 19, 565-572. 
113 
 
O’Brien, L. T. & Major, B. (2009) Group status and feelings of personal entitlement: The roles 
of social comparison and system justifying beliefs. In J.T. Jost, A. Kay, & H. 
Thorosdottir (Eds.) Social and psychological bases of ideology and system justification. 
Cambridge University Press. 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development [OECD]. (2008). OECD employment 
outlook 2008. Paris. 
Operario, D., & Fiske, S. (2001). Ethnic identity moderates perceptions of prejudice: Judgments 
of personal versus group discrimination and subtle versus blatant bias. Personality and 
Social Psychology Bulletin, 27, 550-561. 
Otto, K. & Dalbert, C. (2005). Belief in a just world and its functions for young prisoners. 
Journal of Research in Personality, 39, 559-573. 
Pelham, B.W., & Hetts, J. J. (2002). Underworked and overpaid: Elevated entitlement in men’s 
self-pay. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 37, 93-103. 
Pinel, E. C. (1999). Stigma consciousness: The psychological legacy of social stereotypes. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 76, 114-128. 
Preacher, K. J., Rucker, D. D., & Hayes, A. F. (2007). Addressing moderated mediation 
hypotheses: theory, methods, and prescriptions. Multivariate Behavioral Research, 42, 
185–227. 
Quinn, D. M., & Crocker, J. (1999). When ideology hurts: Effects of belief in the Protestant ethic 
and feeling overweight on the psychological well-being of women. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 77, 402-414. 
114 
 
Rawn, C. D. & Vohs, K. D. (2006). The importance of self-regulation for interpersonal 
functioning. In K. D. Vohs, & E. J. Finkel, (Eds.), Self and relationships: Connecting 
intrapersonal and interpersonal processes. New York: Guilford Press. 
Schmader, T., Johns, M., & Forbes, C. (2008).An integrated process model of stereotype threat 
effects on performance. Psychological Review, 115, 336–356. 
Schmidt, A. M., & DeShon, R. P. (2007). What do do? The effects of discrepancies, incentives, 
and time on dynamic goal prioritization. Journal of Applied Psychology, 92, 928-941. 
Shah, J. Y., Friedman, R., & Kruglanski, A. W. (2002). Forgetting all else: On the antecedents 
and consequences of goal shielding. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 83, 
1261-1280. 
Shelton, J. N., Richeson, J. A., & Salvatore, J. (2005). Expecting to be the target of prejudice: 
Implications for interethnic interactions. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 31, 
1189-1202. 
Sidanius, J. & Pratto, F. (1999). Social dominance: An intergroup theory of social hierarchy and 
oppression. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Singh-Manoux, A., Marmot, M. G., & Adler, N. E. (2005). Does subjective social status predict 
health and change in health status better than objective status? Psychosomatic Medicine, 
67, 855-861. 
Skaggs, S. (2012). Race, gender, and the labor market: Inequalities at work. Gender and Society, 
26, 123-125. 
Snibbe, A. C., & Markus, H. R. (2005). You can’t always get what you want: Educational 




Spencer, M. B., Noll, E., Soltzfus, J., & Harpalani, V. (2001). Identity and school adjustment: 
Revisiting the “Acting White” assumption. Educational Psychologist, 36, 21-30. 
Steele, C. M. (1997). A threat in the air: How stereotypes shape intellectual identity and 
performance. American Psychologist, 52, 613-629. 
Steele, C. M., Aronson, J.(1995). Stereotype threat and the intellectual test performance of 
African Americans. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 69, 797–811. 
Tangney, J.P., Baumeister, R.F., & Boone, A. (2004). High self-control predicts good 
adjustment, less pathology, better grades, and interpersonal success. Journal of 
Personality, 72, 271-324. 
Taylor, D. M., Wright, S. C., Moghaddam, F. M., & Lalonde, R. N. (1990). The personal/group 
discrimination discrepancy: Perceiving my group, but not myself, to be a target for 
discrimination. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 21, 254-262. 
Taylor, D. M., Wright, S. C., & Porter, L. E. (1994). Dimensions of perceived discrimination: 
The personal/group discrimination discrepancy. In M. P. Zanna & J. M. Olson (Eds.), The 
psychology of prejudice: The Ontario symposium (Vol. 7, pp. 233-255). NJ: Lawrence 
Erlbaum.  
Thibaut, J., & Walker, L. (1975). Procedural justice: A psychological analysis. NJ: Erlbaum. 
Thibaut, J., & Walker, L. (1978). Theory of procedure. California Law Review, 66, 541-566. 
Thompson, W., & Hickey, J. (2005). Society in focus. MA: Pearson. 
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1992). Advances in prospect theory: Cumulative representation 
of uncertainty. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 5, 297-323. 
Tyler, T. R. (1989). The psychology of procedural justice: A test of the group values model. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 67, 850-863. 
116 
 
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (2010). Highlights of women’s earnings in 2009. Report 1025. 
van den Bos, K. (2001). Uncertainty management: The influence of uncertainty salience on 
reactions to perceived procedural fairness. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 
80, 931-941. 
van Prooijen, J. W. (2009). Procedural justice as autonomy regulation. Journal of Personality 
and Social Psychology, 96, 1166-1180. 
van den Bos, K., & Lind, E. A. (2002). Uncertainty management by means of fairness 
judgments. In M. P. Zanna (Ed.) Advances in experimental social psychology (Vel. 34, p. 
1-60). NY: Academic Press. 
Walster, E., Berscheid, E., & Walster, G. W. (1973). New directions in equity research. Journal 
of Personality and Social Psychology, 25, 151-176. 
Walster, E. Walster, G.W., & Berscheid, E. (1978). Equity: Theory and research. MA: Allyn and 
Bacon. 
Walton, G. M., & Spencer, S. J. (2009). Latent ability: Grades and test scores systematically 
underestimate the intellectual ability of negatively stereotyped students. Psychological 
Science, 20, 1132-1139. 
Wicklund, R. A., & Gollwitzer, P. M. (1982). Symbolic self-completion. NJ: Erlbaum. 
Wigfield, A., & Eccles, J. S. (1992). The development of achievement task values: A theoretical 
analysis. Developmental Review, 12, 265-310. 
Wills, T.A. (1985). Supportive functions of interpersonal relationships. In S. Cohen & L. Syme. 
Social support and health. FL: Academic Press. pp. 61–82. 
Zeigarnik, B. (1927). Das Behalten erledigter und unerledigter Handlungen. Psychologische 
Forschung, 9, 1-85. 
117 
 
Zirkel, S., & Cantor, N. (1990). Personal construal of life tasks: Those who struggle for 
independence. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 58, 172-185. 
 
